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Allindividuals or families do not receive the same income or earnings.
This inequality, the most indisputable fact about the distribution of
income, has been found in capitalist and socialist economies, in democra-
tic and dictatorial countries, and in biblical through modern times. There
are other characteristics of the income distribution that are nearly as well
documented for modern countries. For example, the distribution is not
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419symmetrical but has a longer right-hand tail, and both average income
and its variance generally increase with education and age.'
Economists have constructed various theories that purport to explain
the income distribution. Some aspects of these theories have been tested
against empirical observations.2 This study will extend the range of such
tests. In addition, we will generate some new facts that a complete theory
should be able to explain.
ThePersonal Distribution of Earnings
Personalincome is equal to the sum of labor earnings, returns to capital,
and transfer payments. The distribution of transfer payments and of
returns to financial capital will not be examined in this study. We shall
focus primarily on earnings from work, to which the introductory
statements on inequality also apply.
Most theoretical and related empirical work on the distribution of
earnings falls into the "human capital" or "stochastic" theory categories,
or constitutes some blend thereof. The human capital model assumes that
people are paid a wage equal to their (real) marginal product. This wage
varies over individuals because of differences in inherited or acquired
skill levels. The stochastic theories assume that an individual's earnings
over time depend on the cumulative history of random events.
Many of the models that economists have proposed to explain some or
all of the features of the earnings distribution are presented in Section II.
Some problems with these theories are also given in this section along
with some testable hypotheses. Section III contains a description of how
the NBER-TI-I sample was obtained and the major characteristics of the
sample. The main regressions on which this study is based are given in
Appendix A. In Section IV we discuss the effects pf particular coeffi-
cients, grouped into categories, in the regressions for earnings reported
on separate surveys conducted in 1955 and 1969. The categories in order
of appearance are: education, mental ability, family background, work
experience, compensating adjustments for nonpecuniary rewards, and
finally, business assets.
In Section V we examine the extent to which the distribution of
variables in each of these categories are the causes of variance, skewness
and kurtosis. This section also examines the Lorenz curves for 1955 and
1969, and the stability of these curves. The stability of an individual's
position in the overall distribution is examined in Section VI. This section
also tests certain aspects of the human capital and stochastic theory
models. Section VII contains conclusions.
420 TaubmanII. SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR LABOR
Atraditional method of analyzing labor markets is via supply and
demand curves. Suppose for the moment that all people are homogene-
ous with respect to skills that determine earnings. Assume that with a
given quantity of capital and other factors of production, the marginal
product of labor decreases as the number of employees increases. In a
competitive labor market (with no on-the-job training), employers will
hire that number of workers at which the marginal product is equal to the
real wage rate, W/P(forconvenience we shall set Pat 1 and henceforth
speak of wages only). The supply of labor will depend on the real wage
rate and an equilibrium will be found where the supply and demand
curves intersect.
In our example, an equilibrium wage rate of Wo will clear the market
and everyone who works the same hours will earn the same amount. This
conclusion, which is not valid, depends crucially on the assumption that
each person has the same skills. This study is based on the proposition
that many different skills—inherited and acquired—help determine
earnings. It is fairly easy, however, to incorporate many of the skills into
the above analysis if what is known as an "efficiency units "model is valid.
Suppose individual one, who has a particular complex of skills,is
designated as the "standard" person. Let capacity be designated as C. As
long as C1/C1 always equals b1, we can state that the fth person is
equivalent to b1 standard workers.
Since the employer would be indifferent to hiring person 1 at a wage of,
say, W0 or person jat a wage of b,W0, the demand curve can be redrawn in
standard worker units. The supply curve can also be drawn in efficiency
units as !1b1Q, where Q1 is the quantity of labor thejth person would offer
at a particular standardized wage rate. In this efficiency model, a person
who is 110 percent of standard capacity will always receive a wage 110
percent of the standard wage, but the equilibrium level of the standard
wage will vary with the supply and demand curves.
An important set of questions that relate to this model are: What
particular skills determine capacity? Are these skills inherited or
acquired? Is the quantity of acquired skills consistent with the amount
economists would define as optimum? Before considering these ques-
tions, however, we will examine briefly a model in which relative capacity,
C1/Ci, is not fixed but varies.
The world of work is subdivided into many different occupations,
which are associated with different tasks and levels of responsibility. For
example, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles differentiates thousands of
occupations, some of which require physical strength; some, mental
ability; and some, combinations of particular skills. A person's relative
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tions.3 Thus, a person's observed relative capacity would depend on the
occupation he worked in, which, in turn, would depend in part on the
occupational wage structure. Though this model is complicated, in princi-
ple it is still possible to formulate and solve it as a general equilibrium
model, in which individuals choose that occupation which yields them the
highest income or utility.4 One particularly important feature of this
occupation-skill model is that some skills may not be at all useful in some
occupations.5
Now let us return to the simpler efficiency units model. At the end of
our previous discussion of this model we raised certain questions about
what skills determine earnings or capacity. At a general level, we can
classify those skills as cognitive, affective, physical, and psychological.
Cognitive skills include learned facts and information, as well as recall
and decision-making abilities. Affective skills include leadership and
social behavior. Physical skills include strength, coordination, and dex-
terity, while psychological skills include extroversion, reaction to stress,
and degree of neuroticism.
At this stage of our knowledge, we hardly know which particular skills
determine earnings or capacity, since no sample contains reliable meas-
ures of all feasible skills and few samples contain direct measures of even
a representative skill from each of the categories mentioned.6 However,
several studies have shown that certain aspects of intelligence and of
leadership are valid. See Taubman-Wales (1974), Griliches and Mason
(1972), Wise (1972), and Featherman (1971).
Suppose, however, that we have measurements on an exhaustive list of
skills for each individual. We could then estimate an earnings equation
such as
(1) Y=aX,+bX2 CXm+U
whereYis earnings, X1,...,X,,,are the Mmeasures of skill, and u is a
random error representing "luck" or institutional phenomena.7
Each coefficient in the equation indicates the effect on earnings of
increasing the associated X by one unit. It is worth noting that the
coefficients may not be stable over time. For example, suppose there is a
big increase in the supply of any X. In the efficiency units model, this will
lead to shifts in the supply curve (in efficiency units) and a decrease in the
standard wage rate, which, in turn, would decrease all coefficients
proportionately. In more models, the effect on the coefficients of
an increased supply in any one skill level depends on the individual supply
and demand elasticities for each skill as well as on cross elasticities of
demand. But in general the coefficients will not change proportionately.8
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While estimation of equation 1 with many skills would represent a
major achievement, our task would not be over, since we would then want
to know what determines the level of each Xor what policies could affect
the distribution of earnings.
Inheritedand Acquired Skills
Thelevel of any skill or attribute a person possesses at any point in time is
determined by his genetic endowments and by his enviromnent.9 As we
are using the term environment, it includes all postconception events that
influence the individual. Thus, it encompasses formal and informal
training for all the skills discussed earlier, prenatal diet, expenditures on
health which determine whether skills can be used, and random events. A
huge literature has been devoted to assessing the relative importance of
nature and nurture for particular skills and attributes.10 As we come
closer to estimating equation 1, this literature will become more impor-
tant in economics, but at the current time it does not seem necessary to
summarize it.
Since we have neither measured all the possible skills nor know their
nature-nuture combination, we shall not estimate equation 1. We shall,
however, make use of a modified procedure. Suppose each of the X,'s
is represented as a function of genetics and environment.If,for
example,
(2)
where G is genetic endowments, N is environment, and I is the indi-
vidual, we can then rewrite equation 1 as
(3) Y, = = +fN1
Equation 3 represents progress primarily because we do have measures
of several aspects of environment.
Training
Peoplelearn or increase their skill levels in many ways, with some
methods better for some skills than for others. However, some of the
most important "training" institutions are the family, the peer group, the
school, the military, and the job.
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psychological development by a variety of subtle and obvious means
including: the behavior and attitudes of parents and siblings; material and
nonmatenal goods and services provided to the child; love and affection;
and degree of permissiveness in rearing. While it would be most useful
and convincing if we could incorporate measures of parental behavior,
love, material goods, and so on, in our equations, we do not have such
information and are reduced to using proxies.
There are several difficulties in interpreting the coefficients of a proxy.
A proxy, by definition, is assumed to be correlated with the true but
unobserved variable. But the proxy may be insignificant, because it is
too crude a measure, i.e., has too low a correlation with the true variable.
Alternatively, the proxy may be correlated with several true variables
whose separate effects we may be interested in. For example, father's
education may be related to his earnings, his methods of child rearing and
certain genetic (and thus partially inheritable) abilities." Fortunately, if
several proxies are used, it can be shown that each proxy will tend to
reflect the underlying variable with which it is most highly correlated.'2
We shall use proxy variables such as family income and wealth,
religion, urban or rural residence, and parents' education and occupation,
which are all often available and often made use of. We shall supplement
this list with other proxies that we think are related to child-rearing
techniques and family atmosphere.
The peer group can also affect the amount of schooling a person
acquires and can directly affect all broad skill categories through its
attitudes and reward structure, but the only available information which
might be related to peer-group effects is a question on how the individual
spent his time while growing up.
• Both sociologists and economists have incorporated formal schooling
into the earnings equation. It must be emphasized that schooling can
affect cognitive, affective, physiological, and psychological skills though
there is no reliable information on which of these changes determine
earnings.'3 The most common though obviously very crude measure of
education is years of schooling. However, following the lead of Solmon
and Wachtel (1975), who used the same sample, we shall also incorporate
certain measures of college quality.'4
While all the people in our sample worked, the amount and type of
work and of learning on the job has varied by individual and can affect
earnings. Indeed, a major innovation in the earnings distribution litera-
ture is Mincer's theory of investment in on-the-job training, which is
described below in more detail. For the most part, we measure this by
years on civilian jobs, but we also examine the effects of military service
and of time spent in one occupation on earnings in another.
Taubman
rr
Taste for Risk and Nonpecuniary Rewards
Themodels we have been examinining explain earnings by differences in
skills. It is possible, however, to explain some features of the earnings
distribution by differences in tastes toward work or nonpecuniary returns
from work. Friedman (1957), for example, has suggested that skewness
arises because while most persons are risk averse, some people are risk
lovers.'5 Those in the latter group may initially choose an occupation in
which there is a small chance of a very high income. Since success is not
won overnight, eventually we observe some of these who succeed, and
over time the average earnings of the winners grow more than those of
persons who were risk averse.16
Friedman's model is closely aligned with that of von Neumann-
Morgenstern, in which a person bases his decisions on the expected value
of the utility of a set of outcomes, defined as Y.P1U(Aj), where P1 is the
probability of the A1 event occurring and U(Aj) is its utility. Suppose A,
equals B. Then it can be shown that if a person has diminishing marginal
utility, he will attach more utility to, and choose, A. In other words,
he is averse to risk. Alternatively, if his marginal utility exhibited
increasing returns, he would be a risk lover and choose B in the above
example.
While, in principle, it is possible to conduct controlled experiments in
which people choose between various alternatives to determine an
individual's utility function and degree of risk aversion, we do not have
that option. Instead, we shall use questions dealing with preferences for
employment versus self-employment and with the desire for job security
to estimate crudely the amount of earnings people have been willing to
forgo for safety.
The reduction in average earnings of the risk averse can be thought of
as a nonpecuniary reward, called peace of mind, received by those who
dislike risk. There can be many other positive and negative nonpecuniary
rewards attached to jobs. Those rewards are important in our study of the
determinants of the earnings distribution because nonpecuniary rewards
can induce offsetting changes in monetary rewards.'7 The choice between
pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards can be treated in the general
framework of utility maximization.'8
There are also substantial problems in quantifying the tradeoffs
between monetary and nonmonetary returns. The two major difficulties
are determining which of all possible nonpecuniary returns are relevant
and measuring differences in preferences. However, since the data set
that we are using has measures of only a few possible nonpecuniary
rewards, we have not had to choose. Our measures are crude and relate
primarily to whether a particular reward was operative at a time of
LifetimeDistribution of Earnings 425occupational choice. The many problems associated with these measures
are discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 in Taubman (1975).
III.THE NBER SAMPLE
Inthis study, our empirical work will be based primarily on the 5,100 men
in the NBER-TH sample.'9 The sample was drawn from a group of some
75,000 men who during 1943 volunteered to enter the Army Air Force's
pilot, bombardier, and navigator training program. The people in this
group obviously had to meet the health and physical requirements to be in
the Anny. Also, according to Thorndike and Hagen (TH), to enter this
program, "a man first had to be single, be between the ages of 18 and 26,
pass a fairly rigorous physical examination, and pass a screening aptitude
test, the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination. This examination was
primarily a scholastic aptitude test, though perhaps with a slightly
technical and mechanical slant. The qualifying score on the screening test
was set at a level that could be reached by approximately half the high
school graduates, the country over."20 The men who qualified and
volunteered for the program were then given a battery of some seventeen
tests which measure various types of mental and physical skills. These test
scores as well as certain biographical information on hobbies and family
background determined which of the men were accepted for the Air
Cadet program.
Thorndike and Hagen (TH) decided in 1955 to draw a sample of
17,000 men who had taken a given battery of tests between July
and December 1943. Beginning in late 1955 and throughout 1956,
TH received responses from some 10,000 civilians and 2,000 men still
in the military. The questionnaire that they used, which is to be found in
Sources of Inequality of
21contains,among other things,
an earnings occupation history from World War II to the date of the
questionnaire
22
In1968, Taubman and Wales (TW) contacted Thorndike and learned
that he had retained a printout of the test scores, earnings, and a few other
items for 9,700 people who were civilians in 1955, and also the completed
questionnaires for about 8,600 of these men. With the concurrence of the
Air Force, Thorndike kindly agreed to make available all of this
information, as well as the address list as of 1956.
It was recognized almost immediately that it would be possible to
update addresses via army serial numbers and the V.A.'s life insurance
and claims file.23 Thus, John Meyer and F. Thomas Juster of the
426 Taubman
rNational Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) quickly agreed to
conduct another interview using Bureau funds. This questionnaire, which
is to be found in Sources of Inequality, was eventually answered in 1969
and early 1970 by some 5,100 out of about 7,500 people for whom
correct addresses were available.24 1'W initially used the detailed infor-
mation on education, ability, family background, and personal charac-
teristics from the two surveys (for about 80 percent of the men) to
examine the rate of return to education and the use of education as a
screening (signaling) device.
The respondents had been promised summaries of the results of the
questionnaire. When mailing these summaries in 1971, the NBER
included a short questionnaire to try to resolve some of the puzzles raised
by TW and others. Some 3,000 people responded to this one mailing.
When funding was received from the National Science Foundation (NSF)
for this project, another large questionnaire dealing with more aspects of
family background and other matters was sent Out and was returned by
4,474 people.25 These last two questionnaires are also to be found in
Sources of Inequality.
TH found little in the way of response bias in 1955. Taubman and
Wales have shown that in 1969 the mentally more able and more
educated were more likely to respond. However, TW also showed that
there was no significant difference in the 1955 earnings equations
between those who did and those who did not respond in 1969; thus, the
data can be used for structural analysis.26
SampleCharacteristics
Thequalifications needed to be a potential member of this sample
guarantee that the NBER-TH sample will not be representative of the
U.S. male population of the same age. About one-quarter of the men fall
into each of the categories of high school graduate, some college,
bachelor's degree, and at least some graduate work.27 Also, a person had
to be in the top one-half of the I.Q. distribution to enter this program and
the average ability level has been heightened by the aforementioned
response bias.
The average age in 1943 was 21, with three-quarters of the men aged
19 to 22.Atleast in 1943, the program's qualifications assure us that its
men were, on the average, in better mental and physical health than the
U.S. male population aged 18 to 26. Given that these men volunteered to
train for flight duty, it seems likely that they are less risk averse than the
population as a whole, which may be a partial explanation of the high
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percentageof people who are self-employed in 1969.28 We do not know
how many nonwhites, if any, are in the sample, though the education and
test aptitude qualifications suggest to us that whites probably make up 99
percent of the group.29
In her dissertation, Wolfe (1973) has compared this sample and the
corresponding U.S. age cohort of white males for a number of charac-
teristics. She finds a higher percentage of Jews and a smaller percentage
of Catholics in this sample. The men in this sample have fathers with
above-average education (and occupational status) and fathers-in-law
with even higher educational attainment. Also, the people in this
sample have above-average earnings in each year studied, even if the
comparison is made with white males of the same education and
age, with the differentials greater at a later age and at lower levels of
education.
It is of some interest to compare the earnings inequality in this sample
with that of the random sample of white males aged 45 to 59 (in 1966)
studied by Kohen, Parnes and Shea (1975). They find, for example, that
the share of total family income received in 1968 by the bottom 25, 50,
75, and 95 percent is 14, 35, 62, and 89 percent, respectively. In the
NBER-TH's sample each of the corresponding figures is smaller by 5 to 6
percentage points. Thus, despite having a more restricted range in mental
ability, education, and risk aversion, the NBER-TH sample has more
inequality in family income than a nationwide cohort of about the same
age. This result may be due to the heavier concentration of self-employed
men in NBER-TH or to the heavier concentration of people in the
NBER-TH in the right-hand tail of the earnings distribution.
Clearly the sample is not representative of the U.S. population, and in
the case of education and I.Q., does not have any members representative
of a large portion of the population. Moreover, some of the dimensions in
which it is nonrandom will be shown to be related to earnings. The
nonrepresentativeness and truncation of some variables will mean that
the distribution of earnings should not correspond to that for the U.S.
population. Still, the sample can be thought of as a random stratified
sample in which the weights for various strata do not correspond to the
population weights.3° It is well known that such unequal weighting will not
cause the coefficients estimated from the data to be biased. Thus, we can use
this sample to study the effects of education, ability, and so on, on various
aspects of inequality. We cannot, however, extrapolate the results to
those levels of education and ability not included in our sample. And as
noted above, measures of inequality such as variance should not be the
same as in the population. However, such inequality measures calculated
within education and ability groups or the changes in the measures over
time may apply to the population.
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EARNINGS AT VARIOUS POINTS OF TIME
Inthis section we shall summarize the results of the earnings equations for
1955 and 1969, presented in the appendix, by comparing the relative
importance of coefficients of various variables. It is important to realize
that we are discussing partial regression coefficients in which all other
variables in the equations in the appendix have been held constant.
Several measures of importance can be used. In this section we shall be
concerned primarily with those related to the range and to the variance in
earnings. Later we will consider issues connected with skewness and
kurtosis. An obvious measure of importance is the R2 or the amount of
the variance explained by the set of variables. Of course the R2 in our
sample may not generalize to the U.S. population because our sample is
truncated in education and ability and is drawn more heavily from some
strata than others. Since we do not know all respects in which this sample
differs from the U.S. population nor how to extrapolate the results to the
truncated portion of the population, we shall not try to calculate a
weighted R2. Many of these problems are less severe when we compare
total or partial R2's for the same people but in different years.
The variance explained by a set of independent variables combines two
elements—the predicted value of the dependent variables, Y1, as com-
pared to the mean of Y, and the number of times eachoccurs. An
alternative measure of importance is the difference in the average level of
earnings, Y1 —Y2,caused by a set of variables. This range measure is
related to the 1', —Yportion of the variance but does not indicate how
many people are at each Y.3'
For ease of exposition, we shall discuss the 1955 and 1969 results for
one variable at a time. Unless otherwise noted, these results are drawn
from equations in which many other variables have been included. The
variables which have been held constant include: education, mathemati-
cal ability, various measures of socioeconomic background of the respon-
dent and of his wife, information on self-employment and on teaching, a
crude measure of risk preference, age and work experience, health, hours
worked, marital status, and attitudes toward nonpecuniary rewards.
While we have included many variables, we never explain more than 45
percent of the variance in earnings. The coefficients of any included
variables will be biased if correlated with any omitted variable which
determines earnings.32
Because of computer capacity limitations, we were forced to drop some
variables which were consistently nonsignificant in preliminary runs.
Table A-3 in Appendix A lists all of the variables that we tried but which
were not significant in our earnings equation. In the equations presented,
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significant in either the next to the last runs or in the Taubman-Wales
equations from which this analysis commenced. When we cite coefficients
for variables not in the last equation, the numbers are taken from the




Formalschooling can affect physical, cognitive, psychological, and affec-
tive skills.33 It would greatly increase our understanding of what school-
ing does if we could identify the particular skills that affect earnings and
measure the change in all skills produced by schooling. However, since
we do not have such measures or even know what the appropriate skills
are, we shall have to be satisfied with crude measures of quantity and
quality of schooling. N
Werepresent quantity by level of education obtained. We use dummy
variables for various responses. Earnings in 1969 generally increase with
education.34 However, despite our having included variables to hold
constant nonpecuniary rewards, including those associated with precol-
lege teaching, risk preference, and self-employment, those with just a
bachelor's degree earn more than those with some graduate work. As
shown in Table 1, the increase in earnings from education for the average
high school graduate ranges from 8 percent for some college to 82 percent
for non-self-employed M.D.'s, with bachelor's degree holders receiving
20 percent more.35 (We have standardized by the average non-self-
employed high school graduate's earnings of $10,300.)
In 1955, the same general pattern emerges, except that the effects of
education are uniformly smaller and are not always statistically signific-
ant. For example, obtaining a bachelor's degree or some college would
add 11 and 5 percent more to the $6,000 (1958 prices) received by the
average non-self-employed high school graduate. However, our self-
employment variables are only measured in 1969. The resulting measure-
ment error has probably caused us to overstate the relative returns to
education of the not-self-employed in 1955.36
The total effect of education may be understated if one of the
mechanisms by which education alters earnings is measured after the
completion of education and is also included in our equations. One such
route would be the occupation the person was in. The variables on
occupation we have used in these equations are teacher, self-employed
businessman, professional, and business assets. The teacher variable is
included because we felt that teachers receive more nonpecuniary




1955, 1969, Numberof Numberof
AverageAverageObservationsObservations
Level of Schooling Age 33 Age 47 as of 1955b as of1969b
Some college 5 8 1,145 1,162
Bachelor's 11 20 1,415 1,332
Some graduate 8 18 220 250
Master's 6 29 336 419
PhD. 13 43 238 298
LL.B.C 6 53 140 140
M.D.C 71 82 48 48
NOTE: The variables in the equation which have been held constant include: education, mathematical ability,
various measures of socioeconomic background of the respondent and of his wife; information on
self-employment and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference, age and work experience,
health, hours worked, marital status, and attitudes toward nonpecuniary rewards.
8Calculated for the average high school graduate, not self-employed, who attended the quality of college of the
average person with just some college.
bInthehigh school category, there were 1,246 observations in 1955 and 1,139 in 1969.
cmthis equation this variable was also included in Ph.D. group. Moreover, these are salaried people only.
rewards asa substitute for earnings than are received in other
occupations.37 The various self-employment measures are designed to
eliminate all of the return on financial capital included in the earnings
estimate; rewards for bearing the extra risk of entrepreneurship; and
perhaps unmeasured attributes that lead to being a successful business-
man. However, it is possible that these measures have incorporated some
of the influences of education. For example, education's affect on prior
earnings could conceivably explain much of the difference in the accumu-
lation in business assets; however, crude analysis suggests that such
effects of education would be small. Moreover, if the self-employment
variables were not included, the bachelor's, some college, and master's
coefficients would all be smaller because the self-employed are more
concentrated at the lower education levels.
It is also possible that a person's tastes for nonpecuniary rewards or risk
bearing are partially formed by education. The inclusion of the so-called
nonpecuniary variables caused the some college and bachelor's level
coefficients to decrease and the graduate level coefficients to increase in
both years.
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College Quality
Asa crude measure of college quality, we have included for each person's
undergraduate school the Gourman Index (of Academic Quality).38 In
1969, we find that attendance at a school that ranked 100 points (the
standard deviation) higher in the index is associated with a $450 increase
in earnings. After our usual standardizing, the effect of the 100 point
difference in college quality of 4k percent is about half the size of the effect
ofobtaining some college.In1955,a100 pointincreasein
undergraduate-school quality leads to a $140 increase in earnings or 2k
percent after standardization. Once again this is about half the size of the
coefficient on the some college variable.39
The quality index used is obviously not the only one possible but we
have not studied this problem in detail since it is the focus of the work of
Wales (1973) and especially of Solmon (1973).
MentalAbility
InTW it was found that the seventeen tests taken by the people in 1943
contained at least four factors, but only the first factor, which was denoted
mathematical ability but which probably correlates well with a standard
1.0. measure, was a significant determinant of earnings.40
In both 1969 and 1955 we tested for an interaction between mental
ability and all other variables by computing separate equations within
each ability fifth. Using analysis of covariance, we could not reject the
hypothesis that the effects of all variables, including education, were
independent of the level of ability in each year.
In both 1955 and 1969, as shown in Table 2, the coefficients on two of
the top four fifths are significant. These coefficients are not sensitive to the
inclusion of the self-employment-related variables.4' The effects of each
fifth increase in ability add a percentage to earnings in 1969 than
in 1955, with the differences more pronounced in the top two ability
fifths.
The numbers in Table 2 can be compared directly with those in Table 1.
Thus the average difference in earnings between those in the top and
bottom fifths of ability (14 percent and 19 percent in the two years)
exceeds the effect of obtaining a bachelor's degree in 1955 and is nearly as
large in 1969.
A person's test scores generally depend on his innate ability, the quality
and quantity of pretest schooling, and differences in other aspects of
"environment." Often we would like to know what portion of test scores
F (and associated earnings) are due to genetics and to environment.
Suppose that the measures of religion, parents' and own educational
attainment, occupation, income, and so forth, included in our earnings
432 TaubmanTABLE 2Increase in Earnings in 1955

















4th fifth 9 14 972
Top fifth 14 19 1,047
NOTE:The variables in the equation which have been held constant
include: education, mathematical ability, various measures of
socioeconomic background of the respondent and of his wife;
information on self-employment and on teaching; a crude
measure of risk preference, age and work experience, health,
hours worked, marital status, and attitudes toward non-
pecuniary rewards.
aThe dollar difference is divided by the not self-employed high school
graduate's average earnings.
thebottom fifth there were 808 observations.
cNOtsignificantat the 5percentlevel.
are the only environmental differences that determine test scores. Ability
coefficients in the earnings equations would then be net of the environ-
mental influences.42 Of course, if other aspects of environment affect test
scores, the ability coefficient will still be a mixture. Taubman and Wales,
who examined the genetic/environmental problem, conclude that in the
tests we are using most of the variation in scores is due to genetic
differences (or other nonmeasured dimensions of environment). This
finding in no way tells us innate ability is more important than learned
knowledge, since we have not examined the effects of various types of
learned knowledge on earnings.
Since the sample includes only the top half of the I.Q. distribution, it
seems safe to conclude that ability is a more important direct determinant
of the range of earnings than education for those who are at least high
school graduates. Even when self-employment information is not used,
the same conclusions are reached, though the differences are smaller.
I-
Family Background
Anindividual's "socioeconomic background" can determine earnings for








in Various SES Characteristic?
1955, 1969,
Average Average Number of
Socioeconomic Measures Age 33 Age 47 Observations
Father's education
Attended high school 6b 7b 1,409
Attended college 4b 5b 770
Father's occupation
Business owner 2b 5b 1,699
Teacher lb 360
Mother's education
Attended high school 3b 3b 1,671
Attended college 4b 685
Family never moved before high
school graduation _1b _5b 1,452
Jewish 33 40 239
Protestant _3b 2,910
Religious school several
times per week —9 —11 236
Never went to religious
school
—.1b _3b 1,509
Biogc 2nd fifth and
biog 3rd fifth 4 5 1,795
Biog 4th fifth and
biog top fifth 11 1,893
Father-in-law's education




Privateelementary school 4b 27b 21
Private high school 25 29 99
Time spent on sportsd 4b 10
Time spent on choresd _3b —10
Time spent on hobbiesd 3b _6b




NOTE:The variables in this equation whichhavebeen held constant include: education, mathematical ability,
various measures of socioeconomic background of the respondent and of his wife; information on
self-employment and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference, age and work experience,
health, hours worked, marital status, and attitudes toward nonpecuniary rewards.
The omitted categories can be found by subtracting the included ones from 4,600.
5The dollar difference is divided by earnings of the average, non-self-employed high school graduate.
bNot significant at the 5percentlevel.
CBiog is a weighted average of information on activities, education, preferences, and family background which
was formed by Thorndike and Hagen from data collected by the military in 1943.
dDjfference between spent most time and hardly any time.
Ccontinuous variables.
differences in "training" which increase cognitive, affective or physical
skills; nonmonetary tastes; and business contacts, pull, and nepotism.
The measures of family background we have analyzed include: father's
education and occupation; mother's education and labor force participa-
tion; wife's education and her parents' education and occupation; various
data related to family income, wealth, and city size while respondent was
growing up; how the respondent spent his time while growing up, age at
entering school, and religious preferences.43 The results are given in
Table 3.
In TW, the two measures of socioeconomic status (SES) used were
father's education and the so-called biography variable. This biography
variable is based on the respondent's family income and education, his
sports and interests, and his pretest education and grades as
reported in
It was, of course, a bit frustrating that a variable made up of so many
disparate items with unknown contributions determined earnings. Thus,
we are happy to report that inclusion of information collected in 1969 and
1972 similar to that collected in 1943 has substantially reduced the size of
the biography coefficient, but the top two-fifths are still significant and the
coefficients are monotonic. It is interesting to note that the big shift in the
1969 and 1955 coefficients occurred only after we included information
on attitudes toward nonpecuniary rewards and a proxy for family wealth,
implying that these are the components in the biography variable
that influenced earnings. The differences between the top two-
fifths and bottom fifth are 11 percent and 8 percent in 1955 and 1969.
This is one of the few variables that has a smaller percentage effect in
1969.
In this study, father's education is insignificant both in 1969 and in
1955. Part of the reduction of significance of this variable occurs when the
father is an owner variable is introduced. However, the reduction in size
and significance of the coefficient is primarily associated with the
introduction of the respondent's business assets variables. Since this
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variableis not often used in other studies, there isa suggestion
that father's education is a proxy for family wealth and business owner-
ship.45
There are other SES variables which are significant. Perhaps the most
interesting of the new measures are the Jewish and Protestant variables.46
Compared to Catholics (as well as to atheists, agnostics, and others, who
all earn about the same amount in the various years), Jews received from
33 to 40 percent more earnings than the average high school graduate and
Protestants from 3 to 9 percent less.47 The reader is reminded that these
differences are net of the influence of education (including M.D.), mental
ability, self-employment, and various other personal attributes and fam-
ily SES dimensions.48
At least for the generation being discussed, it seems likely that those
who are Jewish had more of a taste for acquiring knowledge, and as
shown in Taubman (1975) achieved more education and went to better
schools, given ability and other SES measures.49 Hence, for given levels
of schooling and mental ability in 1943, Jews may have acquired more
knowledge useful in earning a living. Given the evidence in Taubman
(1975), I would suggest that religious upbringing affects motivation and
other psychological skills. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility
that some unmeasured, genetically determined characteristics are related
to religion. Unfortunately, since we do not know what unmeasured
attributes are important determinants of earnings, we cannot usefully
examine the genetics literature to see what if any differences exist by
religion.50
The idea that the extent of religious commitment or the differing
environment in families of various religions can mold the individual
receives some further support in the sample. That is, we find that those
who remembered attending religious classes (not parochial school)
several times a week earn 9 to 11 percent less than those who attended
once or twice, whereas those who did not attend earn 1 to 4 percent less.
Since the latter group would not have come from "typical" families of the
1920s and 1930s, it seems possible that the variable represents attitudes
toward material success.
Another set of variables which reflect both the type of family and
affective, physical, cognitive, and psychological attitudes that can be
formed by the family and the peer group are contained in the question
(asked in 1972): "Indicate how you spent your time while growing
up."5' The categories examined were sports, hobbies, chores, part-time
job,reading,and other. The last two groups were never significant and
will not be discussed here except to note that reading is related to the
ability measure and educational attainment. The remaining categories
were significant in 1969 but only part-time job was significant in 1955.
436 TaubmanThe difference in earnings of those who spent practically no time and
those who spent the most time on part-time jobs is 5percentand 11
percent in 1955 and 1969, with the working group earning more. It seems
likely that the latter group came from poor families and needed money
for themselves and/or valued financial success greatly. These men would
be willing to work hard and apparently have succeeded, with success
being cumulative over time.52 In 1955 and 1969 those who spent much
time on sports while growing up earn 4 percent and 10 percent more than
those who spent practically no time on sports. Several explanations for
this result are available. First, activity in sports may show up in later life as
better physical fitness, and as shown below, healthiness is related
to earnings. (In this explanation, 1955 has a smaller impact because of
less health deterioration at that age.) Second, most sports involve
both a competitive and cooperative structure which are also found in
many work situations. That is, a boy's play is training for a man's work.
Third, activity in sports may be indicative of energy and aggressiveness
that pay off in the business world.53 Finally, there is some indication
in Thorndike and Hagen that in 1955 sports distinguishes company
presidents and vice-presidents from treasurers. This suggests that
sports in the 1920s and 1930s was an indicator of family wealth and
availability of leisure time, or an indicator of attitudes such as risk
taking.
The hobby variable has practically no effect in 1955 but in 1969 those
who spent the most time on hobbies received 6 percent less, which
is significant at the 10 percent level in the final equation. The most
obvious explanation for this finding is that many, though not all,
hobbies represented the opposite of sports and the effects should be
reversed.
The last and perhaps most difficult of these to explain is the chore
result. Those who spent much time on chores earn 3 percent and 10
percent less in 1955 and 1969 with the former not significant. Initially, we
had expected chores to be a proxy for "willingness to take on responsibil-
ity" and to have a positive effect. Merton, however, argues that families
who insist on their children doing chores are lower middle class and are
very interested in conformity. He further argues that these families will
produce "tame" individuals who make the ideal bureaucrat and who
receive less earnings than people in riskier jobs (see below). We might
add that Merton only refers to one piece of empirical evidence, which, he
acknowledges, is not very compelling.
As might be expected, time spent on chores and on a part-time job are
positively correlated (R2= .13)but the differences in emphasis of paid
and family work apparently reflect different types of environment and
different types of men.
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family upbringing and taste formation. Parental income or wealth can
also influence a child's earnings by being used to purchase goods that
produce marketable skills, by being a proxy for nepotism, or by being a
proxy for genetically determined skills.
One possible proxy for family income is father's education, which, as
we have already indicated, is not significant once business assets are
included in the equation. Another possible proxy is father's occupation
but this also does not explain directly much of the differences in earnings,
with the other variables held constant.54
Two extremely important determinants of earnings are type of elemen-
tary school and type of high school attended. The coefficient on private
elementary school is positive but not significant, probably because 22
of the 29 people who went to private elementary school went to private
high school. Thus the elementary school coefficient only measures
the extra earnings above private high school. Those who attended both
privateelementaryandprivatehighschoolin1955earn
29 percent more than those who always went to public schools.
In 1969, those who went to private elementary and private high
school earn 56 percent more than those who did not go to private
school.
Our explanation for this result is that those who went to private
elementary schools in the 1920s came from very wealthy families who
provide a good home environment and/or genes, or who used pull to aid
their sons. The pull argument seems to be the most likely, since the
variable is primarily a proxy for large amounts of wealth.55
We are still left with the need to explain the change in the coefficient
between 1955 and 1969. We would argue that a screening, sorting
explanation is relevant, since even if nepotism is involved, one wants to
see how good the person under consideration is before giving him an
important job; of course, a person can probably become vice-president
more quickly if his father owns the company.
Another interesting finding in our equations that suggests nepotism is
that father-in-law's education, measured continuously in years, is a
significant determinant of the respondent's earnings in both 1955 and
1969.56 A primary explanation of these results is that business and social
contacts provided by the father-in-law are important. But there can be
other explanations. For example, daughters from good social back-
grounds may have the necessary graces—not learned in school—which
help to promote their husbands. Alternatively, women with successful
fathers may be able to spot and marry men with those characteristics that
made for their father's success or push their husbands into achieving
success.
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TInterestingly, mother-in-law's education also is positively related to
earnings in 1969, with the high school variable somewhat greater than the
college variable, though the two are combined in the final equation. This
finding makes it less likely that women are marrying men who are like
their fathers and suggests nepotism.
Thus far, we have been concerned with the effects of individual aspects
of SES on earnings. Except for religion, none of these has an impact as
large as ability or education on the range of earnings in 1955 or 1969.
However, it is possible for a person to fall into the top or the bottom
category of all SES measures. Using the significant coefficients only, the
average difference in earnings for such "extremists" would total about
$14,000 or 140 percent of our average earnings in 1969, and $5,500 or 90
percent in 1955, and far exceed the direct effect of ability or education on
earnings.57
The other dimensions of SES that we have tried but have found to be
insignificant, perhaps because of their crudeness, include: whether the
respondent was the youngest or oldest sibling, additional crude proxies
for family wealth based on type of house; the labor force status of the
respondent's mother when the respondent was less than 5 and less than
14 years old; being reared on a farm; size of city or town he grew up in; the
region of the country in which raised; and age at time of entry into school.
To conclude this section, we should like to discuss several objections
that have been raised concerning the SES variables and that might also
apply to some of the taste and other variables still to be discussed. One set
of objections is that the variables used have multiple interpretations and
have not been validated as measures of the phenomena that we ascribe to
them. Our defenses against this set of objections are: that when many
proxies are used, each one tends to represent the one or several forces it
correlates with most closely; that since we do not yet know what
dimensions of SES affect earnings nor have a theory to guide us, it is
important to use the empirical information at hand to suggest variables
which should be validated; that a form of validation is replication,
which has been performed successfullyinthe1955 and 1969
equations and in Taubman (1975) for education, ability, and net
worth variables.
Another set of objections is that, perhaps, because of the absence of a
well-specified theory, we have tried many variables and may only be
observing chance correlations. This argument suggests that 5 percent of
the SES variables might be significant due to chance, but we have found
more like 40 percent significant. More importantly, none of the variables
not significant in 1969 are significant in 1955 and nearly all of the
variables significant in 1969 are also significant in 1955.58 The R2
between earnings in the two years does not exceed .2; thus, the
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years does not exceed one-third of 1 percent.
Maturationand Work Experience
Awell-known and documented result is that (real) earnings increase with
age tjll at least age 40. While we do not have data for all ages, the results
for 1955 and 1969 in Table 4 certainly are in accord with this finding. The
TABLE4Age, Experience, and Hours Worked
Coefficients on: 1955 1969
Age .08 —.11
Year of first full-time job —.11 —.15
Hours worked, first job, 1969 .07
Hours worked, second job, 1969 —.03 —.12
Weeks lost due to illness, 1969 —.03' —.18
NOTE: The variablesinthis equation which have been held constant include:
education, mathematical ability, various measures of socioeconomic
background of the respondent and of his wife; information on self-
employment and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference, age
and work experience, health, hours worked, marital status, and
attitudes toward nonpecuniary rewards.
'Not significant at the 5 percent level.
general explanations for the upward sloping age-earnings profiles are (1)
as people age, mental and physical maturation increase those skills that
determine earnings, (2) work experience and learning by doing increase
earnings-related skills, (3) people are promoted on the basis of perfor-
rnance on the job and/or seniority, and (4) beyond a certain age
senescence sets in or skills depreciate.59
Without distinguishing, for the moment, type of work experience, time
on the job can be represented as TJ =(age—yearof first job —H),where
H represents such things as time not working because of illness, unem-
ployment, and departures from the normal period of time to complete a
given level of schooling. If maturation is important, then age should have
a separate effect from TJ.
Both age and year of first job (at the 6 percent level) are significant in
1969, but apparently senescence or depreciation has set in, since age in
Table 4 is negative. In 1955, the separate age effect is nearly zero. The
year-of-first-job coefficient can be treated as the negative of the experi-
ence coefficient. Thus, contrary to most findings, the absolute value of the
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IIexperience coefficient is greater later in life, even though we have deflated
by the Consumer Price Index. However, between 1955 and 1969, the
effectofyearsexperiencehasonlyrisenabout50percent,
which is less than the percentage increase in average earnings of non-self-
employed high school graduates or people with any other education level.
That experience is more important than maturity in 1955 is not surprising
given the evidence in Mincer (1974). It is somewhat surprising to find
large senescence effects in 1969, since the discussion in Bloom (1964)
suggests little changes in intelligence and certain other skills before age
50, and since weeks lost through illness have been held constant.6°
However, the results may also be due to discrimination on account of age
for those who were fired in 1968 or 1969.
To try to refine the work-experience measure, we included information
on military service after initial discharge, and type of work experience.
We find that the additional military-experience data do not explain
earnings, perhaps because military experience is a good substitute for
civilian experience, or because, contrary to the above, experience on the
job is not important. In Taubman (1975) we find that the earlier people
enter into high-paying occupations, the more they earn in 1969 and that
some 1955 jobs are better preparation than others, depending on one's
1969 occupation. These results suggest that some training is not general
and that some people were in the wrong jobs in 1955 if they wanted to
maximize their lifetime earnings.61
Earnings depend on hourly wage rates and hours worked. Unless there
is a backward-bending supply curve of labor, higher wage rates will lead
to greater hours worked and more earnings.62 In 1969, each additional
hour per week on the first job adds $70 to annual earnings.63 If we use an
average hourly wage rate per week of $350, we would estimate crinthe
footnote as about —1.2. Each additional hour on the second job is
associated with a $120 decrease in earnings, apparently because some of
those people with low wage rates want higher material standards. Thus,
both results, which rely on perhaps erroneous estimates of hours, suggest
that the supply curve has some backward-bending sections.
Despite the fact that the hours data refer to 1969, we included them in
1955. The hours on second job are still significantly negative, while the
hours on first job have become negative and insignificant. It appears that
moonlighters work hard over long periods of time, since hours on second
job is negatively related to recalled estimates of initial earnings and to the
probability of the wife's working in 1968.
Weeks lost through illness in 1969 has a negative impact on 1969 and
1955 findings but only the 1969 coefficient is significant. The $180 a week
lost would indicate a $9,000 a year job if the figures exclude paid sick
leave, but we have no way of knowing if this is how the question was
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ness variable used by TW to become insignificant.
NonpecuniaryRewards
Thereare monetary and nonmonetary rewards from a job. Since we
expect people to base their job-choice decisions on the total of pecuniary
and nonpecuniary rewards, those occupations which pay heavily in a
nonpecuniary form should have a compensatory change in wage pay-
ments. We do not have available measures of the nonpecuniary aspects of
various occupations, which we shall assume to be occupation specific, but
equally accessible to all; however, we do have some crude information
related to the preference of individuals on specific nonmonetary aspects
of a job. For example, the respondents were asked, "Assuming that you
thought that the financial possibilities were about the same, would you
prefer to work for yourself or for somebody else or no preference?"64 In
1955, those who preferred to be salaried earn 6 percent less than the
TABLE 5Nonpecuniary Tradeoffs with Earnings, Relative to
Salary of Average High School Graduate




Prefer to be salaried —6 —10 962
Teacher —10 —18 256
Reasons for taking 1972
occupation field when
Prospects of future financial success —9 —17 1,200
Chance for independent work
5C 1,519
Person-to-person contact
Chance to help others 8 8 2,090
Represented a challenge —13 —10 784
Job security 8 13 1,415
Free time —2'
NOTE: The variables in this equation which have been held constant include: education, mathematical ability,
various measures of socioeconomic background of the respondent and of his wife: information on
self-employment and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference, age and work experience,
health, hours worked, marital status, and attitudes toward nonpecuniary rewards.
aThe dollar differences are divided by the earnings of the average non-self-employed high school graduate.
Each coefficient refers to a 'no" answer; hence, "yes" and the "no responses" are the omitted groups.
cNot significant as the 5percentlevel.
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1 1average (non-self-employed) high school graduate (see Table 5). In
1969, the people who preferred to be salaried earn 11 percent less. It is
important to realize that these results are from equations which hold
constant being self-employed and amount of business assets.
We are interpreting the answer to the question as indicating risk
preference, and that following the expected utility approach, risk averters
give up some average earnings to reduce dispersion. Is this a reasonable
interpretation? Taubman (1975) discusses in some detail how this
variable could correspond to an economist's definition of risk aversion.
We conclude there that in a formal sense, if respondents thought like
economists, the question would distinguish between risk averters and risk
lovers. In a less formal sense, people may simply be responding to their
belief that a particular occupation is risky. This question was asked in
1969. It is possible that people who failed in their work now choose the
salaried answer because of their failure. However, in Taubman (1975),
Chapter 8, we show that this variable is not related to a (self-reported)
measure of the difference between actual and expected financial success.
However, an alternative explanation of the question might be that those
who value being their own boss would earn less, especially since those
who prefer independence in working do earn less (see below). While the
results do not support the "being your own boss" explanation, this may
mean that this explanation does not dominate the risk interpretation in
this sample. While the results do not prove the risk interpretation result,
there is, however, some evidence that bears on this issue which tends to
corroborate it. As discussed in Taubman (1975) Chapters 8 and 9, this
same variable determines schooling, the amount of business assets, and
returns to capital in a manner consistent with risk preference. Finally, it is
also worth reporting that the variable is significant and has the same sign
in nearly all within-occupation equations. Moreover, in her dissertation,
Wolfe has found that those who prefer to be salaried have less children
for a given income, i.e., appear to be less willing to risk having
children.65
Another set of questions asked in 1972 was, "As best as you can
remember, what factors influenced your decision to enter the occupa-
tional field you are in at the present time? Check yes or no to each of the
following and indicate factors that were of special importance."66 In our
equations, the dummy variable for each factor used was set at one if the
respondent answered "no."
In 1969, the salary, person-to-person contact, and free-time variables
were not significant in preliminary runs though salary nearly was. The
other variables indicate that those who were not worried about future
financial success receive 17 percent less than those who were worried (or
didn't answer),67 those not interested in independent work earn 10
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who wanted to have a challenge earn 17 percent more, and those
interested in job security receive 13 percent less earnings.68 In 1955,
when many of the people were in different jobs and even in different
occupations, nearly all of the same variables are significant, and all the
signs on the variables significant in 1969 are the same, though the
magnitude is always less than in 1969.
Intuitively, all of these results seem quite plausible, and each one is
internally consistent with the others. However, there is still the question
of whether these variables are related to nonpecuniary preferences. This
issue is discussed in detail in Taubman (1975), where it is concluded that
the variables are probably related to preferences. This conclusion is in
part based on the findings in Chapters 8 and 9 that the variables have
effects consistent with the above interpretation in other equations.
Moreover, the introduction of these variables has a big impact primarily
on the various graduate education variables, which seems quite reason-
able, since we often think that Ph.D.'s and other graduate students
choose nonpecuniary rewards, such as independence in work or helping
others.69
The basic threads running through these findings are that people who
are willing to work hard on difficult or risky projects will end up with
substantially more earnings, while those who are more interested in the
intrinsic rewards of the job will receive less. While this is hardly a startling
conclusion, we know of no other study which has been able to obtain
significant impacts after holding constant such things as education and
ability. Moreover, the consistency of findings between 1955 and 1969
suggests that the 1972 survey responses are not ex post rationalizations,
and this is confirmed by the finding in Chapter 8 that responses to these
variables are not a function of ex ante/ex post differences in monetary
success.
The tradeoffs of earnings with nonpecuniary returns is quite large.
Excluding the teacher dummy, which is discussed below, but including all
the other significant coefficients in Table 5, we find that the difference in
earnings due to various nonpecuniary preferences could be as high as 55
percent or $5,500 in 1969, and 40 percent or $2,500 in 1955, which are
greater than all education effects except that for M.D.
The last nonpecuniary-related variable that we have used is that of
being a precollege teacher. We find that such people earn 10 percent and
18 percent less in 1955 and 1969. The premium paid to be a teacher is
even larger before the nonpecuniary variables are introduced, which
seems reasonable. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that
teachers earn less because they are less able.
TaubmanBusiness Assets
Therespondents were asked for their "earnings," without definition of
the concept. However, we would expect the self-employed to report their
net income from their business, since most people would find it difficult to
separate earnings derived from labor from those derived from capital. To
try to hold constant the returns from capital, we have included a dummy
variable for self-employed businessman, another dummy for self-
employed professional, and most importantly, a continuous variable on
amount of business assets.7° All of these variables were measured only in
1969. The extra measurement error involved in using these variables in
1955 undoubtedly affects the comparability of our answers and our R2,
though comparison of 1955 and 1969 equations, which only use data
available in both years, indicates that general conclusions on R2 are not
affected. We shall interpret the coefficients on the business-asset variable
as the rate of return on financial capital invested in business.7'
In 1969, the coefficient on the business-asset variable, which is an
estimate of the before-tax rate of return, is .12. Such a figure is not unlike
the .7 to .10 estimates usually found in studies such as Kravis (1962).72
The dummy variable for self-employed businessman is still significant,
though assets and hours worked are included in the 1969 equations, and
equals 10 percent of the standardized base. The self-employed profes-
sionals, who may not have much in the way of financial investments,
receive 31 percent more than the non-self-employed professionals
(though the denominator is too low, since, for comparability, we have
divided by the average earnings of high school graduates).
In 1955, the coefficient on 1969 business assets is still highly significant
(a tof11) at .03 even though the growth of assets must not have been
uniform during the period, and some people must have changed their
self-employment/salaried status. Probably because of the increased
measurement error involved in using the 1969 asset and hours variables
in 1955, the 1969 self-employment businessman dummy is as important
in 1955 as in 1969. On the other hand, the 1969 self-employed
professional dummy is not significant, presumably because many of these
people were salaried in 1955 and had not had a chance to display their
true worth to their employers.
Conclusion
Themany and varied comparisons made in this section lead to several
important conclusions. First, the effects of nearly all variables change
during a person's life cycle and, in general, display a profile that increases
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'a --4withage. Second, the profiles are steeper for the education variables than
for most other variables, though as shown in more detail below, the
steepest profile is for those who attended private elementary school.
Third, even after holding constant a wide variety of variables, we still find
that education leads to large and statistically significant differences in
earnings. These differences, however, are relatively small in comparison
with those arising from the conglomeration of family background,
attitudes, and nonpecuniary preferences and are no larger than the
differences which are the result of ability. While we shall return to the
topic below, it is also important to realize that a large portion of the
çlifferences in annual earnings is due to unmeasured variables and
random events.
V.INEQUALITY: EXTENT AND CAUSES
Inthis, as in most samples, the distribution of earnings is skewed to the
right.73 Since most people assume that something called "ability" or
capacity is normally distributed, much attention has been paid to the
question of why earnings exhibit a skewed distribution.74 Becker (1964)
and Mincer (1970) have demonstrated that such distributions can be
generated by "acquired" human capital models. Mandelbrot (1962)
explains skewness solely in terms of many different inherited skills.
Champernowe (1953), Aitchison and Brown (1957), and others have
shown that stochastic processes that operate continuously can generate
skewed distributions.75 In Friedman's model (1953), skewness arises
from behavior toward risk rather than from differences in abilities.
Inequalityin Earnings
Theinequality in earnings can be measured in several ways.76 One
important measure is the Lorenz curve, which indicates the percent of
total earnings received by the top X percent. The Lorenz curves for 1955
and 1969 are presented in Figure 1. Also drawn in that figure is a diagonal
which is the Lorenz curve that would be observed if each person had the
same earnings. In all years studied, earnings are not distributed equally
and are below the diagonal.
All summary measures of relative inequality of two Lorenz curves will
yield the same ranking provided the two curves do not intersect.77
Conversely, if the curves intersect, there are always some measures that
would disagree on whether curve 1 or 2 is more unequal. Since earnings
do not follow any well known distribution, we have used the nonparamet-
nc Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS) to determine if the difference in the
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Percentage of Total Earnings Held by the Bottom X
Percent
Lorenz curves is statistically significant. Results of the KS test indicate
that the 1969 curve is statistically different from (more unequal than) the
1955 curve.
We also have examined the Lorenz curves for various education and
mental ability groups.78 In either 1955 or 1969, the Lorenz curves for any
two mutually exclusive groups, such as high school and some college,
were never significantly different at the 5 percent level though many were
at the 10 percent level. For any particular group, the 1969 curve was
always beneath the corresponding 1955 curve and the maximum differ-
ences which range from 6 to 10 percentage points were always significant
at the 5 percent level. Thus, there is little difference in inequality in




earnings between various education and ability groups in any year but in
each case there is more inequality in 1969 than in 1955.
FromVariance to Kurtosis
Thusfar we have indicated that earnings inequality has varied from year
to year. For many purposes, however, it is necessary to ask how particular
features of the distribution have changed over time and to what extent
these features and their change are the consequence of the distribution of
education, mental ability, and so on. A quantifiable and at times
decomposable description of a distribution can be obtained from various
"moments" of the distribution.79 The first four moments measure the
mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the distribution.
In 1969, in Table 6, our standard deviation, o,is$9•4•80 Insome types
of labor markets, we would expect o-toincrease when average earnings
did. For these cases a standardized measure is provided by the coefficient
of variation, 0-/mean, which is about two-thirds in 1969.
Several measures of symmetry have been proposed in the literature. To
avoid reranking the observations as we hold constant education and other
sets of variables, we shall use the third moment standardized by the
second to eliminate scale effects. A distribution is skewed to the right
when this measure is positive, as is our 1969 estimate of 3.0. At the 5
percentlevel, we can reject the null hypothesis that the population is
normally distributed, which is symmetric, using a test developed by
Fisher.
Kurtosis measures the frequency of observations in the tail or near the
mean of the distribution. We use the fourth moment divided (standard-
ized) by the second. From this ratio we subtract 3 which is the expected
value of the kurtosis in a normal distribution. Larger values such as our 12
indicate that there are too many observations in the tails or too few near
the mean as compared with the normal curve.
In 1955, the mean earnings are $7,300 (in 1958 dollars). The standard
deviation is $3.8 thousand and the coefficient of variation is about 1/2.
Our skewness and kurtosis estimates are 5.4and62.0 respectively,
neither of which would be in accord with the null hypothesis that the
distribution is normal. Thus in both 1955 and 1969, the distribution of
earnings is skewed to the right and has larger numbers of people in the
tails.
Given the differences between our sample and the U.S. population, the
results on the various inequality measures in any one year have restricted
interest until we control for education, ability, and so forth. But the
changes during the 14 years are of substantial interest—especially since
such data are not generally available over such a time span and so late in
the life cycle.
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Y 9.42 3.05 13.90
Y— Yi 7.75 2.76 14.75
Y— Y2 9.11 3.22 15.27
Y— Y3 9.33 3.11 14.31
Y— Y4 8.63 2.82 13.39
Y— Y5 9.20 3.12 14.61
YY6 9.33 3.05 13.91
Y— Y7 9.06 3.11 14.78
Y8 9.37 3.01 13.71
1955
Y 3.81 5.35 61.99
Y— Y1 3.41 5.56 78.24
YY2 3.74 5.47 65.09
Y— 1'3 3.78 5.41 62.88
Y— 1'4 3.65 5.40 68.50
Y— 1'5 3.74 5.46 64.29
Y— Y6 3.80 5.32 62.34
Y— Y, 3.69 5.42 65.12
Y Y8 3.80 5.33 61.99
NOTE: The Y1through's'8 series are based on equations in
Table A-I in Appendix A.
= all variables.
= education coefficients, including M.D. and LL.B., and
the Gourman rating.
= mental ability variables.
Y4=business assets, and the self-employed businessmen and
professional dummies.
= prefer to be salaried and the 4 other nonpecuniary
variables.
= age, year of first job, hours worked, hours on second job.
Y7=time spent, private schools, in.law, biography, religion,
size of current town, never-move variables.
Y8=teacher, no response in 1972, weeks lost from illness, age
entered school, religious school attendance, and weight
variables.
Between1955 and 1969, the mean earnings in constant dollars grew by
about 100 percent. Since the standard deviation increased by a greater
amount than the mean, the coefficients of variation increased by 27
percent.8' The changes in the skewness and kurtosis measures are both
negative. Thus, contrary to the usual interpretation of stochastic theories,
the distribution is becoming less asymmetric and less deviant from a
normal curve as the people age (though the 1969 curve is far from a
normal curve).82
UfetimeDistribution ofEarningsI
Sources of Variance, Skewness and Inequality
Oursample is, of course, better educated, mentally more able, probably
less risk averse, and more limited in age than the population. Since all
these characteristics affect earnings and have a distribution different from
that in the population, there is no reason to expect to find that the
distribution of earnings is the same as that in the population. Despite this,
we can still use the sample to study some problems of interest. For
example, suppose the true equation in the population is
(1)
where X1 is a vector of (measured) independent variables, a is the
associated vector of coefficients andare errors arising from random
events and unmeasured variables. Because our distribution of the X's
differs from the population, we have an unequally weighted stratified
sample.83 As long as the u's are distributed the same as in the population,
we can study the distribution of Y— Xa =uto determine what the
population distribution would be if everyone has the same education and
ability, and if wage rates did not change.
In examining the sources of various aspects of inequality, several things
must be noted. First, since the equation's coefficients are selected so as to
minimize the variance of the residuals with no attention given to the
skewness or kurtosis, the results (on sources) are less reliable for these
latter two measures than for the variance.84 Second, despite this caveat,
the effects of the X's on skewness and kurtosis might be larger than those
on variance.85
Table 6 contains estimates for 1969 of the standard error, skewness,
and kurtosis with the latter two standardized by the standard error raised
to the appropriate power.86 This standardization is appropriate, since we
are primarily interested in the question of whether the distribution would
be normal or would be much less skewed if ability, and so forth, were the
same for everyone. But variables which reduce the residuals will also
reduce u3 or u4; thus, the resulting series could be as skewed though
Y1—Y)3would be smaller.
We present the estimates for earnings (Y) and residual earnings,
(Y— where X*arefersto a subset or all of the variables used in the
equations in Table A-i. If we had estimated an equation with just X8',
generally we would have obtained different estimates of these coeffi-
cients. But since such coefficients would be biased estimates of the true
parameters, it was felt that it was better to use the estimates from the
comprehensive equation.87
Using the most comprehensive equation available, the standard error
of the residual earnings is reduced by about 18 percent to $7.8 in row 2 of
450 TaubmanTable 6. The remaining rows in the table, identified at the bottom,
indicate the effects of various sets of variables. For purposes of reference,
Y2 will be called education, Y3 mental ability, Y4 self-employment, Y5
nonpecuniary tradeoffs, Y6 work-related experiences, Y7 socioeconomic
standing, and Y8 miscellany. The reduction in the standard errors
indicates the partial R's—ignoring sign—of these variables but because
reductions in variance depefld upon the covariance of the independent
variable, the effects of the individual rows are not additive.88
The self-employment data reduces the standard error, a•, by 8 percent,
with business assets being the most important single variable. The SES
variables reduce o- by 5 percent. The quantity and quality of education
variables (including M.D. and LL.B.) reduce u by less than 4 percent and
all other sets of variables have even smaller impacts on u.
In the sample, the standardized skewness measure is 3.05.Asshown
in the Y— Y1 row, the full set of variables reduces the skewness
by 10 percent to 2.76.89 Thus, even if education, ability, SES, business
assets, and so on, were equal for all individuals, the earnings distribu-
tion would be about 90 percent, as skewed as originally, once we
adjust for the reduction in variance from holding each of these items
constant.
Interestingly, when education, ability, and the nonpecuniary tradeoffs
are individually held constant, the standardized skewness measure
increases between 1 and 5 percent. On the other hand, the self-
employment variables reduce the relative skewness by 7 percent and the
miscellaneous variables in Y8 reduce skewness by 1 percent.
Thus, we can conclude that if everyone in the sample had the same
education or ability or nonpecuniary preferences, the earnings distribu-
tion would have slightly more skewness.9° We can also conclude that
differences in self-employment (size of business assets and being self-
employed) have contributed greatly to the existing skewness in the
distribution in this sample.
Now let us examine kurtosis. In the sample the standardized kurtosis
measure had a value of 13.9 which is far from, and significantly different
from, the zero expected in the normal distribution.91 The standardized
kurtosis measure based on the residuals from equation 2 is increased by 6
percent. Looking at the other rows, we find that only holding constant
self-employment and the miscellany in V8 has led to a reduction in
relative kurtosis. Even with self-employment held constant, the distribu-
tion of earnings would exhibit kurtosis. On the other hand, the elimina-
tion of education differences leads to a big increase in kurtosis. This
suggests that education pushes more people away from the mean and
makes for a smoother transition to the tails, whose existence is not related
to education.
LifetimeDistribution of Earnings 4511955
Ouranalysis of the source of inequality in 1955 earnings distributions is
handicapped by thefactthatseveralofour most important
variables—including the self-employment ones—are measured only in
1969 and must have changed between 1955 and 1969. Nevertheless, let
us examine the same statistics on inequality. As shown in Table 6, the
standard error of earnings in 1955 is $3.8 (thousands of 1958 dollars).
Since the 1955 equation has a smaller R2, the standard error of Y— Y1
has only been reduced by 10 percent. The standard error of earnings is
reduced by aboutto 3 percent by each of education, ability, risk
preference, and nonpecuniary variables, work experience, SES and the
miscellany in Y8, but the self-employment variables reduce the standard
deviation by 4 percent.
The 1955 skewness measure is 5.3, which is much greater than in 1969.
Examining the various rows, we find that holding constant any subset
(except work experience and the miscellany) of the whole set of the
characteristics in equation 2 increases relative skewness.92
Much the same pattern appears on kurtosis. The residuals from the full
or any partial set of variables (except the miscellany) have greater
standardized kurtosis than in the original earnings data and this kurtosis is
greater in 1955 than in 1969.
Pattern byEducation Level
Sincewe have eliminated the average difference in earnings for people
with different amounts of education and ability, the above analysis
essentially analyzes the between cell contribution of education and ability,
to inequality. For several purposes it is important to study inequality
within various education and ability cells. As shown in Table 7, in 1955
the standard error is lowest for those with only a high school education,
at the peak for those who started or completed college, and inter-
mediate for those with more formal education than a bachelor's
degree.93 The relative skewness and kurtosis measures increase
sharply from high school through a bachelor's degree, then fall to their
lowest level for those with at least some graduate work. In each edu-
cation group, neither earnings nor the log of earnings are distributed
normally.
In 1969, it is still true that the earnings distribution is neither normal
nor log-normal. In other respects, the pattern is much different from
1955. While high school graduates still have the lowest standard error,
graduate students (including M.D.'s and LL.B.'s) have the highest. The
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Y 2.81 2.87 13.68 7.12 3.59 21.36
Y— 2.50 1.97 9.79 5.74 2.68 17.50
Y— 2.82 2.84 13.50 7.12 3.61 21.50
Y— Y3 2.80 2.89 13.97 7.07 3.61 21.62
y 2.64 2.34 10.74 6.28 3.18 19.41
Y— V5 2.73 2.79 13.26 6.84 3.56 21.64
Y— V6 2.80 2.79 13.10 7.07 3.60 21.68
Y— Y7 2.75 2.82 14.04 6.84 3.47 20.39
Y— V8 2.82 2.80 13.48 7.13 3.52 21.37
Some college
Y 4.30 5.37 51.00 9.79 3.29 15.20
Y— Y1 3.87 5.25 53.81 8.32 2.87 15.45
Y— Y2 4.29 5.30 51.17 9.72 3.30 15.32
Y— Y3 4.30 5.38 50.98 9.75 3.29 15.30
Y— Y4 4.14 5.33 52.67 9.02 3.09 15.58
Y— V, 4.25 5.45 52.48 9.58 3.36 15.96
Y— V6 4.29 5.39 51.45 9.72 3.28 15.12
Y— Y7 4.13 5.30 51.18 9.37 3.23 15.36
YY8 4.30 5.30 50.21 9.76 3.23 14.84
Bachelor's degree
V 4.25 6.30 77.92 9.64 2.81 11.50
Y— Y1 3.93 6.94 99.70 8.38 2.57 11.35
Y— Y2 4.23 6.36 79.06 9.58 2.85 11.80
Y— V3 4.22 6.34 78.52 9.60 2.85 11.76
Y— Y4 4.13 6.41 85.69 9.02 2.48 9.69
Y— V5 4.19 6.40 79.79 9.50 2.85 11.85
YY6 4.22 6.40 80.63 9.50 2.84 12.76
Y— Y7 4.15 6.53 83.65 9.35 2.90 12.60
Y— Y8 4.26 6.32 78.25 9.58 2.78 11.28
Graduate work
Y 3.33 2.53 10.29 10.02 2.96 12.73
Y— V1 2.89 1.56 8.08 8.19 2.65 13.63
Y— Y2 3.12 2.21 9.35 9.55 3.16 14.54
Y— Y3 3.29 2.60 10.84 9.93 3.00 13.02
Y— V4 3.14 2.33 9.55 9.08 2.79 12.74
Y— V5 3.27 2.62 11.03 9.79 3.05 13.53
YY6 3.32 2.53 10.30 9.85 2.97 12.85
Y— Y7 3.32 2.50 10.77 9.80 3.01 13.49
Y Y8 3.27 2.47 10.01 9.83 2.97 13.04
NOTE:For definitions, see Table 6.
'While this row should repeat the row tot Y, there isa small recorded change since a few people whom we treat as
not having attended college went for less than a semester and have a Gorman rating.
Ir
skewnessand kurtosis measures are greatest for high school graduates
and then decrease through the bachelor's level, followed by a slight
increase at the graduate level. The major change in the high school
category between 1955 and 1969 requires comment. We suggest that the
above average growth in the standard error and the large absolute and
comparative increase in the skewness and kurtosis measures occur
because even the talented or lucky individual among high school
graduates finds that it takes longer to get to the top. Thus, in 1955,
these people would not be so far out in the right-hand tail as they are in
1969. Perhaps because of a different distribution of talent among the
more educated, because of credentialism based on education, or because
of nepotism, this same phenomenon does not occur in other education
classes.
More light can be shed on these and other issues by examining the
distribution of the residuals in each education class. Since we are not able
to find significant differences in the coefficients by ability or education
level, we can use the same sets of coefficients that we employed previously
in making these calculations.
Consider first the 1955 results in Table 7. At each education level, the
standard error declines by about 10 per cent, with the self-employment
variables (Y— Y4) generally responsible for the largest reduction in the
standard error and the SES( Y— Y7) and nonpecuniary tradeoffs
(Y— Y5) variables nearly as important.
In all but the bachelor's group, holding the self-employment variable
constant causes a reduction in the relative skewness measure. The
opposite is true in Table 6 for the total sample. It seems likely that this
difference is due to the use of a separate standardization factor in each
education level or, in other words, the total sample combines within
education distributions which have different parameters. In the high
school and graduate level, kurtosis decreases whenself -employment is
held constant, while the opposite is true at the other two education levels.
No other set of characteristics has a large impact on skewness or kurtosis
in 1955 at more than one education level.
In 1969, the picture is more varied. The standard error of Y— V1 is
nearly identical for all but the high school category, which remains the
lowest, and much of the difference in skewness and, to a lesser extent,
kurtosis, disappears. At each education level, holding constant the
self-employment variable substantially reduces the standard error
and the relative skewness and the estimates of relative kurtosis of
the high school and bachelor's degree categories. Once again SES
and nonpecuniary variables play an important secondary rolein
determining the standard error but have little effect on skewness and
kurtosis.
TaubmarlMental Ability
Sincevery little information has ever been presented about the distribu-
tion of earnings by mental ability, it is appropriate to repeat the above
analysis by the five ability levels. Table 8 contains the distribution
statistics for earnings for each ability fifth. In 1955, the standard error is
lowest for the bottom fifth and highest for the top. The middle fifth,
however, has a lower standard error and coefficient of variation than the
group on either side. (Since the standard error of the log of earnings does
not vary with ability, the above results may be due to a few extreme
observations—as is also suggested by the skewness and kurtosis meas-
ure.) Both skewness and kurtosis follow the same pattern, with highest
values in the top fifth; however, none of the earnings distributions within
an ability cell are normal or log-normal.
In 1969, the standard deviation follows the same pattern as in 1955
(though the top fifth has the lowest coefficient of variation). Skewness and
kurtosis are substantially lower in the top two-fifths than in the lowest
three-fifths; however, none of the distributions are normal or log-normal.
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Y 2.91 2.92 14.79 7.81 3.39 17.89
Y— l'1 2.67 1.90 9.54 6.71 2.98 20.23
Y— Y2 2.88 2.89 14.96 7.60 3.55 19.83
Y4 2.83 2.45 12.36 7.24 3.29 20.36
Y— Y5 2.85 2.94 15.27 7.61 3.45 18.49
Y— Y6 2.91 2.81 13.84 7.76 3.40 17.96
Y'— Y7 2.83 2.64 12.60 7.68 3.25 17.48
Y— l's 2.91 2.86 14.67 7.75 3.26 17.02
2nd fifth
Y 3.90 5.39 49.39 9.14 3.50 17.95
Y— 1'1 3.53 5.41 56.95 7.52 2.98 17.57
YY2 3.86 5.41 50.26 8.89 3.55 18.28
Y— Y4 3.78 5.37 52.09 8.38 3.16 17.11
Y— Y5 3.83 5.47 50.96 8.89 3.55 18.66
Y— Y6 3.88 5.44 50.47 9.07 3.47 17.83
Y— V7 3.76 5.31 49.88 8.86 3.56 19.15
Y— Y8 3.89 5.36 49.29 9.04 3.44 17.61












Y 3.32 3.02 13.73 9.06 3.36 16.44
Y— Y1 2.86 2.20 9.98 7.52 2.95 16.64
Y— 1'2 3.22 2.89 13.11 8.81 3.50 17.87
Y— Y4 3.07 2.67 11.89 8.16 3.05 15.37
Y— Y5 3.25 3.07 14.28 8.84 3.44 17.32
Y— Y6 3.32 2.94 13.32 8.97 3.37 16.65
Y— ).'7 3.27 2.99 13.93 8.79 3.44 17.48
Y— l's 3.30 2.98 13.46 9.05 3.31 16.16
4th fifth
Y 3.82 3.80 23.84 9.66 2.77 11.42
Y— Y1 3.40 3.66 25.99 7.76 2.66 13.56
Y— 1'2 3.75 3.89 25.00 9.39 2.95 12.73
Y— Y4 3.63 3.65 23.43 8.75 2.66 11.86
Y— Y5 3.74 3.87 24.71 9.42 2.81 11.93
YY6 3.81 3.76 23.74 9.53 2.77 11.61
Y— 1'7 3.70 3.87 25.24 9.19 2.84 12.18
Y— Y8 3.83 3.78 23.83 9.59 2.71 11.12
5th fifth
Y 4.50 7.27 95.12 10.26 2.77 11.29
Y— Y1 4.17 7.77 114.43 8.81 2.45 10.41
YY2 4.47 7.33 96.74 10.00 2.89 12.16
Y— Y4 4.36 7.51 104.38 9.55 2.49 9.69
Y— Y5 4.45 7.33 96.34 10.12 2.83 11.85
Y— Y6 4.48 7.31 96.70 10.15 2.75 11.15
Y— Y7 4.39 7.41 99.69 9.85 2.82 11.93
Y— Y8 4.49 7.26 95.45 10.21 2.78 11.46
NOTE:See Table 6 for definitions. Y— Y3 is omitted since Y3 contains only the ability variables.
Table 8 also presents the inequality pattern by ability level once other
variables have been held constant. As we have consistently found in
dealing with 1955, the self-employment variables cause the biggest
reduction in the standard error in most ability fifths, with the SES and
nonpecuniary tradeoffs contributions almost as large. In the 1969 data,




rAt first glance, the inequality pattern seems confusing. For example,
when comparing the education results, we find high school to be (about)
the lowest on skewness and kurtosis in 1955 but the highest in 1969. A
similar reversal occurs in the ability results.
A sorting uncertainty model can be used to explain these reversals and
other results contained in Tables 6 and 7. The basis of this model is that it
is difficult to measure in advance a person's capacity to perform in various
jobs. Firms also do not use piece pay rates perhaps because of difficulty in
measuring one person's productivity and of interdependencies within
production lines or hierarchical structures. Firms, therefore, initially
assign people to particular jobs on the basis of certain "objective"
criteria, such as education, marital status, and military record, and certain
"subjective" criteria such as performance at an interview.94 In addition,
appointment may be based on discrimination, as evidenced by race,
gender, or parental pull.
Since firms know that the above criteria or signals are fallible, they
continuously monitor performance on the job to base decisions on which
to fire, to retain, and to promote. Average initial earnings may be fairly
uniform when studied by objective criteria, because of morale problems
associated with different pay for the same position and because at
low-level jobs a person has little chance to use initiative or display
productivity outside of a narrow range.95 People with more potential
capacity perform better, are promoted faster, and have a higher growth
rate in earnings. However, promotions occur somewhat randomly,
because the particular vacancies a person is qualified for occur irregu-
larly, because a person's talent may not be recognized at once if he
"blooms" late, and because family connections or nepotism results in
faster promotions for equally qualified persons.96
Now, how does this model, with some other considerations, explain the
previous findings? First, high school graduates have less objective
credentials and probably less parental pull than the more educated, and
they start at lower rungs in the career ladder. By 1955, the high school
graduates have made some progress, but they have not yet made it to
those positions, such as manager or successful business owner, where
salaries are very high.97 Thus in 1955, high school graduates have a
smaller standard error, skewness, and kurtosis than those with some
college and a bachelor's degree, because some in the latter two groups
have received promotions to very responsible positions. By 1969, when
the men are about forty-seven years old, firms have sorted out people by
capacity; thus the- talented high school graduate has received his promo-
tions and is at or near his potential capacity at age forty-seven. However,
the distribution of talent in the high school group is different from that in
the other groups, with relatively few such talented people among the less
LifetimeDistribution of Earnings 457educated. This difference arises for several reasons. For example, the
more talented partly inherit their capacity from successful parents, who
encourage them to get more education. Second, some sources of their
capacity (such as drive and creativity) may lead to academic leanings and
scholarships. Third, for most people, education may be a necessary
ingredient in the formation of capacity.
Now, how do we explain the ability results? A plausible argument can
be made that the mental ability measure we use is correlated with other
types of cognitive and, to a lesser extent, noncognitive skills. Following
the lines of the above argument, we would expect skewness and kurtosis
for the less able to be relatively low in 1955 and high in 1969. Comparing
the bottom and top fifths, we find this to be the case. However,
Table 8 also indicates very large values of skewness and kurtosis in
the second fifth in 1955 and an extremely large increase for the top
fifth.
While we can construct a plausible explanation of the changes in
inequality measure on the basis of a sorting uncertainty model, other
theories are also consistent with the results. For example, Mincer (1970)




cr2(Yj) — cr2(Es) o(Es)
where
the variance in peak earnings;
cr2(Yj) is the variance in earnings in the overtaking year;
r is the rate of return on postschool investment;
is the variance in the sum of postschool investment;
cr2(Es)isthe variance in initial postschool earnings capacity; and
p is the correlation between dollar investments in schooling and post-
school investment.
We shall discuss the issue in more detail later, but it is approximately
true that 1955 corresponds to the overtaking year (in any event, o.2(Yt)
will increase with t if p is positive). Thus Mincer's interpretation of the
faster growth in o between 1955 and 1969 for high school graduates is
that either p or 0(CT)/cr(Es)isgreater for these people.
Skewness in Mincer's model arises primarily from the correlations
between the means and variances of earnings (within education cells).







where P' and P2arethe correlations betweenand CT andand
respectively. Generally speaking, Pi and P2 will have the same sign as p;
hence, cr3( YP) would certainly exceed cr3(Yj) if and o-3(Es) have
the same sign. The theory would also suggest that the faster the growth in
variance within educational levels, the faster the growth in skewness,
provided the last term is about the same at all education levels. This is
borne out in our sample. The findings are not inconsistent with Mincer's
model and indeed can not be made so since c73(CT) can vary by education
level.
VI.INDIVIDUAL STABILITY IN THE
EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION
Whilemany of our findings are based on variables not previously used in
studies of earnings, in principle the same phenomena could be examined
for different cohorts in Census-type samples. The longitudinal data in our
sample also permit us to extend our understanding of the dynamic
evolution of the earnings distribution and to analyze the relationship of
annual to lifetime earnings by examining the stability of an individual's
position in the earnings distribution over time.
The empirical facts on stability and change over a long time span are
very valuable in themselves, since the distribution of lifetime earnings is
more important for many purposes than that of any one year's earnings.
But equally important, these facts allow us to test, and thus have a chance
to reject, certain earnings' distribution theories, as described below.
IndividualStabilityandChange in the
Earnings Distribution
Toexamine individual stability in the distribution, we have calculated the
"transition probability matrix" for the people who reported earnings in
both 1955 and 1969. Table 9 indicates the percentage of people who
ended up in any tenth of the 1969 earnings distribution from any given
tenth in the 1955 distribution.98 For example, of the people with the
lowest 10 percent of the earnings in 1955, in 1969, 39 percent were still at
the bottom, an additional 30 percent could be found between the 10
percent and 30 percent percentiles, and less than 9 percent have moved
up into the top 30 percent of the distribution. As a simple (ordinal)
measure of stability we can use the average percentile position, which has
risen from 5 percent to 26 percent by 1969.
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Bottom 10% 412 38.7 19.1 10.6 6.5
10<20 484 15.2 21.7 16.5 11.4
20 <30 368 16.4 20.4 14.4 10.6
30<40 358 8.9 12.6 16.2 18.1
40< 50 516 5.4 13.0 13.2 14.8
50 < 60 586 4.9 10.0 7.3 13.9
60 <70 353 3.1 7.1 3.7 6.8
70 <80 565 3.0 2.5 3.5 6.1
80<90 500 1.2 3.2 2.8 4.0
Top 10% 462 1.7 1.5 0.8 1.3
Number, 1969 4,607 451 492 397 428
For contrast, consider the people in the top 10 percent in 1955. In 1969
44 percent were still in the top 10 percent, an additional 35 percent were
in the next 20 percent of the distribution, and only 4 percent had fallen
below the thirtieth percentile. The average percentile position had fallen
from 95 percent to 80 percent in 1969.
In the other tenths in 1955, people tend to be close to their starting
position with, for example, from 39 percent to 64 percent of the people
falling within the same or neighboring tenths of the distribution. Not
more than 30 percent of the people in the row lie above the seventieth
percentile in 1969 until we reach the 60—70 percent interval in 1955,
while at least 30 percent of the row fall below the thirtieth percentile in
1969 until we reach the 50—60 percent interval in 1955. The average
percentile standing in 1969 for each tenth in 1955 rises continuously; but,
on the average, people who were in the bottom 40 percent in 1955 have a
higher percentile standing in 1969, while the reverse is true for those in
the top 60 percent in
1955 1 percent of the
people suffered a decline in nominal earnings; and 15 percent had a
growth of less than 75 percent.'°° For almost 50 percent of the sample,
earnings grew between 75 percent and 175 percent while for 3 percent of

















5.6 6.5 3.9 2.7 3.4 2.6 25.7
10.8 8.9 4.1 2.3 2.0 1.6 29.2
10.0 9.3 7.1 4.8 4.5 1.9 34.6
15.6 11.1 6.7 6.4 2.5 1.7 38.7
16.5 15.2 9.9 7.8 3.1 1.4 42.8
14.6 13.9 11.9 11.1 7.5 4.2 46.9
14.8 16.7 15.3 17.3 11.8 3.3 57.0
11.1 14.0 17.2 17.7 16.1 8.9 62.8
3.8 11.2 9.8 19.0 26.0 19.0 71.3
3.9 6.9 4.5 10.0 25.5 43.7 80.1
491 520 428 470 501 416
NOTE: The cutoff points by tenths for 1955 are: $4,068,$4,788, $5,028, $5,388, $6.000, $6,468,
$7,188,$8,028, $8,798. The cutoff points by tenths for 1969 are: $8,899, $10,000, $12,000,
$15,000, $16,510, $19,000, $23,000, $30,000.
observations, the average percentage change is 175 percent and .the
average annual compound growth rate between 1955 and 1969
is 4.7 percent which, Over 14 years, is equivalent to an increase of
about 90 percent. (There is no reason to prefer one measure to the
other.)
Of the people who were in the second tenth of earnings in 1955, 1
percent had a decrease in (nominal) earnings. Nearly 16 percent (the
mode) had a gain between 125 percent and 150 percent, while 8.5
percenthad a growth in excess of 300 percent. The average growth rate in
earnings in this tenth is 176 percent.
Of the people in the eightieth to ninetieth percentile in 1955, nearly 5
percent had a decrease in their nominal earnings. The mode is in the 75
percent to 100 percent interval, and 14.5 percent had a growth rate in
excess of 300 percent. The mean growth rate in the next to bottom and
the next to top rows are identical; but there are more people in both
tails of the distribution in the eightieth to ninetieth percentile, and
the two distributions are significantly different at the 5 percent level
(KS test).
In all but the two extreme rows, the mean growth in earnings only
ranges from 151 percent to 176 percent and the compound rates range
from .045 to .051. However, those whose earnings placed them in the top
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0<10 .000 .007 .010 .046 .077 .116 .082 .100
10<20 .002 .010 .006 .056 .126 .152 .157 .118
20<30 .000 .005 .035 .070 .138 .177 .087 .130
30<40 .000 .000 .039 .064 .128 .131 .193 .103
40<50 .002 .006 .043 .094 .090 .173 .093 .125
50<60 .000 .000 .026 .099 .141 .178 .152 .105
60<70 .006 .020 .059 .057 .105 .150 .142 .096
70<80 .004 .030 .044 .087 .119 .143 .103 .127
80<90 .010 .048 .062 .068 .118 .114 .098 .092
90<100 .086 .043 .110 .087 .089 .087 .089 .100
Total .011 .018 .045 .076 .110 .145 .115 .113
70 percent to 90 percent in 1955 have distributions which are significantly
different (KS test, 5percentlevel) with more people in both tails than
those in the bottom 10 percent to 50 percent. In the bottom tenth, the
mean change is 267 percent with a heavy concentration in the right-hand
tail. In the top tenth, the mean change is only 143 percent; and there is a
heavy concentration in the left-hand tail.
Distributionof Growth Rates by Education Level
Tables11 through 14 show the growth rate distributions for each of four
education levels. Since, in these tables, cutoff points for the tenths are
those for the entire sample, we may compare the corresponding rows. In
the tenth to twentieth percentile, about 68 percent, 57 percent, 45
percent,and 36 percent of people with high school, some college, a
bachelor's degree, and at least some graduate training had earnings
increases no greater than 150 percent. The average growth in earnings
increases with education for people with the same earnings in 1955.
Despite the relatively small sample sizes within each of these 1955
percentiles, the KS test rejects the hypothesis that the cumulative
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1.75<2.00< 2.25< 2.50<2.75< 3.00<









.107 .070 .075 .043 .036 .135 .092 .2675 .68
.101 .076 .037 .050 .023 .064 .021 .1759 .51
.065 .082 .030 .026 .041 .081 .030 .1806 .46
.123 .050 .039 .031 .036 .042 .017 .1671 .48
.075 .063 .053 .025 .020 .057 .019 .1550 .46
.089 .068 .037 .031 .010 .037 .026 .1715 .45
.105 .102 .023 .031 .031 .059 .018 .1610 .46
.087 .051 .053 .021 .028 .071 .032 .1702 .45
.082 .062 .032 .052 .024 .106 .030 .1760 .47
.065 .041 .039 .030 .024 .089 .022 .1425 .36
.089 .066 .044 .034 .027 .076 .030 .1757 .47
aThose with zero earnings in either year are excluded.
distribution of, say, the second and ninth rows are the same in each
education level.
For any one educational level, the results are similar to those given for
the whole sample in Table 2. That is, except for the top and bottom row,
the mean percentage change is independent of the earnings percentile in
1955.'°' The people at the bottom in 1955 have the highest growth rate,
while those at the top in 1955 have the lowest growth rate (except for the
high school category). Within each education level, those with high
earnings in 1955 tend to have distributions with a greater percentage of
people in both tails than people with low incomes. Despite the relatively
few observations within these tables, the differences in the distribution by
row are significant. Thus, we can conclude that results in Table 10 do not
occur because high school graduates are more concentrated in the lower
percentiles in .1955.
In the appendix, we present several equations in which the dependent
variable is (Y69 —Y55)/Y55.(The reader who wishes to examine the
determinants of Y69 —Y55can do so by subtracting the 1955 regres-
sion from the 1969 one.) The first equation contains all the variables
used in the final equation for 1955 and 1969, while the second adds
Y55.
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0<10 .000 .006 .012 .093 .086 .154 .105 .117
10<20 .000 .012 .012 .093 .216 .234 .191 .100
20<30 .000 .000 .091 .091 .190 .223 .074 .140
30<40 .000 .000 .086 .140 .194 .172 .151 .065
40<50 .000 .005 .116 .152 .152 .223 .076 .112
50<60 .000 .000 .024 .167 .190 .286 .095 .143
60<70 .000 .016 .078 .109 .172 .234 .109 .016
70<80 .012 .049 .074 .210 .222 .136 .049 .049
80<90 .032 .063 .168 .131 .116 .074 .063 .074
90<100 .120 .040 .173 .067 .080 .067 .080 .120
Total .012 .016 .080 .122 .159 .184 .103 .098
TABLE 12 Growth Rate in Earnings 1955 to 1969 by Earnings


























0<10 .000 .000 .010 .040 .102 .163 .061 .112
10<20 .008 .000 .008 .076 .114 .152 .167 .106
20<30 .000 .009 .009 .072 .153 .198 .090 .108
30<40 .000 .000 .042 .073 .125 .188 .208 .104
40<50 .000 .009 .050 .161 .120 .190 .046 .143
50<60 .000 .000 .040 .140 .180 .100 .160 .100
60<70 .000 .045 .112 .067 .123 .202 .135 .045
70<80 .007 .067 .081 .101 .135 .121 .128 .095
80<90 .000 .066 .041 .082 .131 .139 .106 .082
90<100 .081 .060 .081 .126 .104 .096 .067 .067
Total .011 .022 .049 .099 .126 .158 .108 .101
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rGrowth Rate (= 1969 Income Less 1955 Iricome/1955 Income)
1.75<2.00< 2.25<2.50< 2.75< 3.00<
2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 5.00>5.00
.130 .043 .062 .049 .025 .067 .049 1.875 .056
.068 .031 .006 .012 .019 .006 .000 1.246 .037
.033 .033 .017 .000 .025 .066 .017 1.559 .037
.075 .032 .011 .032 .043 .000 .000 1.234 .041
.049 .031 .031 .013 .005 .022 .013 1.260 .036
.000 .024 .024 .024 .024 .000 .000 1.238 .034
.078 .047 .031 .000 .031 .078 .000 1.377 .038
.062 .037 .012 .012 .000 .037 .037 1.354 .034
.032 .053 .000 .074 .021 .095 .000 1.307 .029
.053 .040 .067 .013 .027 .027 .027 1.199 .033
.063 .037 .027 .023 .020 .039 .016 1.386 .034
NOTE:Items in this table are fractions of row sumexcept the last 1wo columns.




1.75< 2.00< 2.25< 2.50< 2.75< 3.00< GrowthGrowth
2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 5.00>5.00 Rate Rate
.092 .071 .061 .030 .051 .133 .082 2.675
.083 .076 .030 .045 .023 .076 .038 1.759
.063 .108 .036 .036 .027 .072 .018 1.800
.146 .031 .042 .010 .010 .000 .010 1.671
.074 .065 .032 .037 .018 .051 .005 1.550
.080 .060 .020 .000 .020 .080 .020 1.715
.067 .067 .011 .022 .034 .034 .034 1.617
.054 .034 .067 .014 .034 .054 .007 1.702
.090 .032 .024 .041 .041 .090 .033 1.700
.074 .059 .037 .022 .022 .089 .015 1.495
.081 .061 .032 .029 .028 .067 .024 1.611 .043
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0<10 .000 .015 .015 .015 .105 .045 .060 .075
10<20 .000 .011 .000 .011 .066 .120 .099 .120
20<30 .000 .016 .000 .078 .094 .125 .063 .172
30<40 .000 .000 .000 .032 .138 .053 .213 .138
40<50 .004 .011 .011 .044 .063 .170 .159 .144
50<60 .000 .000 .016 .063 .143 .222 .111 .079
60<70 .008 .008 .031 .039 .086 .094 .180 .117
70<80 .000 .010 .019 .058 .082 .159 .087 .192
80<90 .011 .040 .038 .048 .136 .115 .107 .079
90<100 .072 .039 .112 .086 .065 .112 .112 .119


























0<10 .000 .012 .000 .000 .012 .047 .082 .071
10<20 .000 .020 .000 .010 .051 .051 .141 .162
20<30 .000 .000 .014 .028 .069 .111 .125 .111
30<40 .000 .000 .027 .000 .040 .107 .200 .107
40<50 .005 .000 .010 .055 .050 .155 .100 .130
50<60 .000 .000 .028 .028 .028 .083 .278 .111
60<70 .014 .014 .028 .028 .056 .111 .111 .194
70<80 .000 .008 .023 .039 .094 .148 .133 .109
80<90 .000 .028 .019 .009 .075 .123 .104 .142
90<100 .080 .030 .100 .050 .110 .080 .090 .100




TABLE 14 Growth Rate in Earnings 1955 to 1969 by Earnings
Percentile in 1955: Graduate Training







2.75 3.00 5.00>5.00 Rate Rate
.119 .105 .105 .015 .045 .164 .120 3.087 .075
.176 .099 .088 .066 .000 .179 .015 2.044 .059
.094 .063 .047 .047 .063 .109 .030 1.938 .057
.106 .096 .043 .043 .043 .074 .021 1.934 .053
.096 .077 .074 .022 .019 .067 .037 1.754 .053
.143 .079 .048 .048 .000 .016 .032 1.926 .050
.141 .164 .016 .023 .008 .078 .008 1.718 .048
.101 .043 .067 .029 .019 .082 .053 1.923 .053
.085 .073 .068 .040 .011 .102 .034 1.794 .049
.066 .033 .033 .026 .026 .105 .007 1.413 .037
.106 .078 .059 .033 .021 .089 .034 1.877 .050
NOTE:Items in this table are fractions of row sums excePt the last two columns.




1.75 <2.00 <2.25 <2.50 <2.75<3.00 < GrowthGrowth
2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 5.00>5.00 Rate Rate
.071 .094 .094 .071 .035 .247 .165 2.147 .095
.111 .131 .051 .101 .051 .080 .040 2.176 .063
.097 .139 .028 .042 .069 .097 .069 2.275 .053
.173 .040 .067 .040 .053 .120 .027 2.085 .060
.100 .095 .085 .035 .050 .110 .020 1.766 .057
.111 .111 .056 .056 .000 .056 .056 2.214 .055
.111 .083 .042 .083 .070 .042 .014 1.827 .054
.117 .094 .039 .023 .055 .094 .023 1.879 .050
.113 .094 .009 .066 .028 .142 .047 2.173 .055
.060 .030 .030 .060 .020 .110 .050 1.702 .044
.105 .090 .052 .054 .045 .113 .046 2.191 .057




Weshall concentrate first on the second equation, which contains Y55
and which has an R2 of .20. The inclusion of Y55inour equation means
that we have held constant all the other systematic determinants of Yand
its percentage change, including luck and K55 —155where K55 is the
stock of investment in on-the-job training and 155 is the investment in
that year.'°2 But the coefficients on the other variables in this equation
represent the effect of each variable on the growth rate, net of the effects
passed on through Y55.'°3
The higher a person's 1955 earnings are, the slower his growth rate rate
will be. The coefficient of —.09 is highly significant with a tvalue of 19. As
just explained, the coefficient on the earnings variable represents the
effect of all the unmeasured variables. Results presented later suggest
that one of the important unmeasured variables is luck. The on-the-
job training variable, K55—155, may also be important though
tests of the theory presented below tend to conflict with Mincer's
theory.
Previous research based on cross-section data has shown that age
earnings profiles tend to be steeper for the more educated. Using the
same people at different points of time, we also find that the average
growth rate increases continuously with education (except for some
graduate), with most of the difference from high school graduates being
statistically significant. The coefficients on the education variables are
larger than most of the other coefficients although attending private
elementary school is the single largest coefficient.
While the average growth rate increases monotonically with ability,
none of these coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. There are,
however, several interesting variables which have significant and large
effects. For example, those who are Jewish have a growth rate 21
percentage points above that of Catholics. Those who attended private
elementary school have a growth rate 80 percent higher than those who
did not. Also, mother-in-law's and father-in-law's education are both
significant and positive.
Of the time spent on youth variables, sports and part-time jobs have
significant positive effects, while chores have a significant negative effect.
The nonpecuniary variables are significant with the exception of helping
others and job security, which is significant at the 6 percent level. Those
not interested in future financial prospects, nor in challenging work, have
a slower growth rate, which is also true for those interested in indepen-
dence in their work. The people who prefer to be salaried have a 10
percentage point slower growth rate.
The age variable has a negative coefficient implying a concave earnings
function. The positive sign on the year of the first job also implies
concavity but this coefficient is only significant at the 7 percent level.
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AThose who were self-employed in 1969 have a faster growth in
earnings. Increased hours on the first job in 1969 also lead to a faster
growth rate, but the opposite is true for hours on the second job.104 Those
who moved interregionally after 1955 have a faster growth rate, as do
those who lived in bigger cities in 1969. Good health in 1969, as reflected
in weeks lost from illness and weight, are associated with higher growth
rates.
We have reestimated the equations, dropping the variables that pertain
exclusively to 1969. The general results are unchanged.
The equations clearly indicate that there are important systematic
elements in the distribution of growth rates from 1955 to 1969. Is there
an underlying structure that explains which of the determinants of
earnings in 1955 and 1969 are also significant in the growth-rate
equations? In Mincer's theory, differential growth rates reflect differen-
tial investments in on-the-job training (OJT). Thus, the more educated,
those whose in-laws have high education, those who attended private
elementary school, those who do not want to be self-employed, those who
do not want to be independent, those not interested in future financial
success, and those who are Jewish, all invest more than the omitted
categories. Mincer may be right, but one still wonders why these groups
are different.
An alternative explanation is that because of uncertainty, people have
to demonstrate their competence on the job, which determines how
quickly they ascend their career ladders. There are different career
ladders with different characteristics. Some careers are relatively safe, but
as a consequence have both a relatively low ceiling on earnings and a
narrow distribution of outcomes. Other careers have higher earnings
ceilings but more risk. Because people are relatively risk averse, the latter
careers have higher average earnings. The difference in earnings between
ladders is greater for older persons because the sorting process takes
place sequentially over time, and people only gradually reach the upper
parts of the hierarchy.
This explanation, which can be applied easily to the risk-preference
and other nonpecuniary variables, can also explain why the other
variables are significant. For example, the in-law and private school
variables can be interpreted as proxies for nepotism. In an uncertain
world, a nepotistic system can function by a person's being given a secure
job and then, only if he has the ability, being promoted (though his
promotions may come faster for equal ability). Since there are pay scales
within a firm, even the owner's son will only receive very high earnings if
he holds an important job. We have argued earlier that the religious
variable is associated with drive and hard work, but such effort may only
pay off cumulatively. Finally, the education findings reflect the types of
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career ladders chosen by the more educated. Very few of our college
graduates worked at any job but owner/manager, salesman, or profes-
sional. Their choice may have been based on opportunities or prefer-
ences, but in any event, these can be the careers within which sorting is
important and ceiling earnings are high. 105
Test of Predictions of Some Earnings Distribution
Theories
Webegin the discussion with the stochastic theories.106 In these models
initial earnings depend on an individual's capacity, but the change in
earnings depends on luck. Let the earnings of the ith individual in year t
be represented by Y, and the random event bywhich is assumed to be
independent of The stochastic theories can be written as
N
(1) Y, = +e,Y,,+e,_,
N
(la) In Y1, =in +e1, = inY,0 +
1=0
The variance ofcan be expressed as
(2) +2
j>k
There is a similar expression for y.
Animportant case arises if the e's are serially independent. Then after
a long enough passage of time, the distribution of Yr will depend solely on
the distribution of e,, the last two terms in (2) will be zero, and %-i-will
increase each year by the addition of Thus, this version of the
stochastic theory predicts that the variance of earnings will increase
continuously with age. Since the theories assume that e, is distributed
independently of and its systematic determinants,should be
homoscedastic over the different education levels and other X's.
Some stochastic models assume that is determined by education,
and so on, and then luck determines Here the correlations of
education, and so on, with Y should decline over time, since the variance
ofincreases while that of Y,, is constant.Moreover, a hypothesis of
stochastic models is thatshouldbe distributed independently of
or
How do these predictions compare with our findings? As shown in
Tables 6, 7, and 8 the standard error of earnings and its log increased
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4between 1955 and 1969 in the whole sample and in each of the education
and ability-groups. However, contrary to predictions of the model, the
errors display heteroscedasticity in both years with respect to both
education and mental ability.
The stochastic theories require that the difference or the percentage
change in earnings be independent of Y55. But Table 10 indicates that
the mean growth in earnings is different at the highest and lowest level of
1955 earnings.108 The difference in mean growth rates might be attributa-
ble to transitory effects that do not become impounded into a person's
earnings base, but such an explanation is not in accord with the model's
Markovian assumptions. As is evident from the pattern of the percentage
changes, and as has been confirmed by direct calculations, the average
difference in earnings increases with the level of Y55.
Education, ability, family background, nonpecuniary preferences, and
other characteristics yield an R2 about 4 points higher in 1969 than in
1955, even when we exclude the information such as business assets
which pertain directly to 1969. This is contrary to the model's prediction.
All in all, the particular version of the stochastic model that we are
testing does not seem to fit the data well. Of course, other versions that
make different assumptions about either the pattern of serial correlations
or the relationship of the e's and the determinants of V0 could be in accord
with the facts. See, for example, Kalecki (1945). However, I have yet to
see a version of the stochastic theory that can be made consistent with all
the findings presented above, unless the sorting model described below is
thought of as a stochastic model.
investmentin On-the-Job Training Models
Next,let us consider the investment in on-the-job training theory as
presented by Mincer (1970). His model can be thought of in the following
terms. Suppose skills learned on the job increase a person's marginal
productivity to many employers. If an employee who receives general
on-the-job training is legally free to accept any job offer at anytime, after
finishing his training he will be paid a wage equal to his new, higher
marginal product (in a competitive market). Next, suppose occupation A
gives no general training and will pay a person the same wage rate
throughout his lifetime, but occupation B involves general training and
has a rising age/earnings profile for an individual. A rational person
would choose the occupation whose earnings stream has the larger
present discounted value. But Mincer argues that with free entry into
both occupations, the present value of the two earnings streams will be
equalized. Since a person will receive a real wage equal to his marginal
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while being trained.
Mincer expresses his theory as
(3)
where Y*(whichdepends on schooling, ability, and so forth) is the
constant earnings of a person who never invests on the job, A is the
fraction of earnings invested or ris the rate of return on invest-
ments in on-the-job training, and Y is observed earnings. Mincer
assumes that investments are a monotonically decreasing function of age.
The change in earnings, —Yr,can be written as — —
kdecreases with age.
Mincer introduces several concepts to help analyze the path of earnings
in 3. One concept is that there is some peak level of earnings,at which
=0. Another important concept is the overtaking point, which is
designated as the year in which r equals or when Yr =Y*.Let
us write asand as
At the peak earnings period, the variance in earnings will be
(4)
where PYK is the correlation between Y and K. While at the overtaking
point, which we designated as /
(5)
In equation 4, the variance over individuals in observed earnings
dependsthe variance of thevariance of investments in OJT and
the correlation betweenand K. At the overtaking point, rICe —and
the variance in observed earnings equals the variance in Y". If r and p are
nonnegative, Mincer's model indicates that the variance in earnings
should increase from the overtaking to the peak year. Also, since
individual variation in investment in OJT is not measured, the contribu-
tion of the measured variables to observed earnings should be greater in
the overtaking year.'°9
The above conclusions are conditional on the sign of p. We can also
derive other tests which also depend on the sign of p, or in which p does
not enter. Suppose we rank individuals by earnings in the overtaking
period (1955) and calculate mean earnings in both 1955 and 1969 for
people within the bottom tenth, second tenth,..., top tenth in 1955.
Then, using equation 3, we can calculate that the mean change in a cell is
(6)
(if r is the same for all).
472 TaubmanNow, ifandare not correlated, the expected value of rK should
be the_same for each cell. If, however,is positively correlated with
the rK will increase with Y1. But the correlation of Y* andis the
"between cell" estimate of p. The model, of course, could be expressed in
terms of In V in which case (5) can be approximated by —Y,)/V,.
It may be helpful to view this problem in another way. If the
distribution ofis independent of Y*, then, when examined at the
overtaking point, Mincer's theory yields the same testable hypothesis on
growth rates as the stochastic theory, expressed in equation la. Mincer's
model, however, yields different predictions when growth rates are
calculated from a year that is not the overtaking point. We can see this
best if we specify the on-the-job training investment function. Mincer in
his analysis often assumes that the individual's investment paths are
exponential as in equation 7
(7)
The implications of this investment equation, which are derived in
Taubman (1975), will be summarized here. Mincer usually restricts b1 to
be the same for all individuals while letting A1 vary. In this case, the length
of the overtaking period is the same for all A although the actual
overtaking year will vary for people of the same age because of
differences in time spent in school and, perhaps, in military service.
Mincer's model, therefore, predicts that those with the higher A1 will
always have higher growth rates in earnings.
If we knew A for each person, we could test the theory directly. We
can, of course, calculate the average earnings that a person with a given
set of measurable skills would receive. But the difference between an
individual's actual earnings and this average would also include the
effects of other unmeasured skills, and so on.
Suppose, however, in a year prior to the overtaking period, we were to
order people by observed earnings and then calculate average earnings
within each of successive tenths in the distribution. For each individual
Y1 —Vwould be equal to —+ wherethese last terms are
calculated about their mean values. A person can fall into the lowest tenth
of the distribution for a variety of reasons.'1° If one thinks of drawings
from distributions of (rK —I)and of Y*, the average value of each of
these variables must be negative in the lowest decile of observed earn-
ings. Similar analysis indicates that the average of rK —Iwill increase
monotonically with average earnings. Note that no mention was made of
any correlation between (rK—I) and Positive or negative correlation
would affect the average levels of (rK —I)and Y" in each tenth, but
would not affect the statements about the qualitative pattern of the
change in the average as earnings increase.
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Sincegrouping by average earnings separates people by average level
of (rK— I), it is possible to determine whether those who have been
investing more in preovertaking years and for whom (rK —I)is smaller,
are the ones with the greater increase in earnings. Similarly, if b varies in
equation 6, those who invest more will have a higher growth rate in
earnings.
According to Mincer, the overtaking point occurs in no more than hr
years of work experience or probably less than a decade. In 1955, in the
NBER-1'H sample, the length of time in the civilian post-World War II
labor market is 8 to 10 years for most high school graduates, 7 to 9 years
for most of those with some graduate work, and 5 to 8 years for those with
one or more degrees.111 As a first approximation, let us assume that
everyone was at the overtaking point in 1955. It also appears that 1969
corresponds to the peak earnings period. (This conclusion is based on the
age distribution of 45 to 52 and on comparisons between the 1969 and
recalled 1968 earnings data.)
Earlier, we observed that Mincer's model predicts an increase in the
variance in observed earnings from overtaking to peak period, for
positive (and for small negative) values of p. The variance does increase
in the whole sample and in every education and ability group for Y
and for ln Y. The model also predicts that the R2 explained by the
measured variable should decrease with age, which is contrary to our
results, even excluding several important variables measured only in
1969.
Our results also provide additional information on p. In Mincer's
theory, coefficients on all skills other than those produced by OJT would
remain constant if OJT did not change, and the change in coefficients
occurs only because of differentials in average iavestment in OJT, The
Y69— Y5 5 coefficients can be obtained by subtracting the two comparable
equations.112 Nearly every variable that has a positive effect on Y69 or
Y55 has a positive effect on the change in earnings; i.e., p would
be positive forallof these variables.Similarly, the growth rate
equations reveal a number of variables which have positive and signifi-
cant effects on earnings, and which are positively related to the level of
earnings.
The material on the distribution of growth rates reveals a different
picture. The average growth rate in the whole sample or in the education
subgroups indicates that p is zero over much of the range but negative if
the highest and lowest values of Y55 are included. Negative values of p
can be consistent with growth in the variance, but such a finding seems
strange, given the above discussion of p from regression results, and,
especially, since those tables do not hold constant the variables with a
positive p.
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Until now we have assumed that everyone was at the overtaking point
in 1955. However, because the more educated have worked fewer years
and because individuals follow different investment paths, this assump-
tion is unlikely to hold for all individuals. Mincer often specifies in his
investment function that bi is equal to b for all persons. For this
investment function, the overtaking period is the same for people with the
same education (who begin work in the same year). But the distribution of
growth rates within education groups, Tables 11 through 14, exhibits the
same pattern of results as above, even if we standardize for differences in
age and time on the job. Thus, if on the average, we are at, or before, the
overtaking point within each education group, p in the in form would be
negative or zero.
There is another possibility to consider. Suppose that contrary to
Mincer, the b's differ; but on the average, people in all educational levels
were at the overtaking point in 1955. At every education level, there will
be a dispersion of b's about b.Sinceearnings increase with education, on
the average, people with high education but low earnings in 1955 must be
investing more than people with less education and the same earnings.
But those people with less education and high earnings in 1955 must be
investing less than the more educated. Thus, at each level of 1955
earnings, the mean growth rate should increase with education as is found
in Tables 11 through 14. But the same argument would suggest that
within an education class, those with smaller earnings in 1955 must on the
average have been investing more than those with larger earnings, and
that the mean growth rates should be inversely related to Y55.'13 Yet in
Tables 11 through 14 the mean growth rates are constant, except for the
very top and bottom tenths, again suggesting negative or zero correla-
tions.
It is possible that high school graduates are beyond the overtaking
point, whereas those with one or more degrees have not yet reached the
overtaking point. For those people not yet at the overtaking point, those
investing more in 1955 should have the higher growth rate. Thus, the
correlation between mean growth rates and 1955 earnings level should
be positive for high school graduates and negative for college graduates.
But once the top and bottom fifths are eliminated, thereis no
correlation at any education level in the average growth rates and
a slight negative correlation at any education level in the compound
growth rates.
The classification by observed percentiles in 1955 may be affecting the
test of Mincer's theory since his formulation does not deny that an
individual's earnings in a year may be affected by random events.
Suppose such events are transitory so that, ignoring the job investments,
Y, =Y+et. Then as in Friedman (1957), we would expect the top and
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bottom tenth of 1955 earnings to include a larger proportion of those with
large positive and negative e's. But with transitory events uncorrelated
over fourteen years, we would also expect those at the top in 1955,
because of large positive e's, to have low growth rates, and so on.
Replacing the observed fraction of people in the top tenth in the left-hand
cell with the overall sample percentage, the average growth rate becomes
about 1.8, while a comparable adjustment for the right-hand cell for the
bottom tenth reduces its average growth rate to about 2.2. This implies a
U-shaped pattern of average growth rates. However, if transitory events
are found in varying amounts throughout the distribution, Friedman's
analysis would suggest that the estimates of p would be biased towards
zero or that the true p would be more negative.
The essence of Mincer's argument is that labor markets function well.
There are several reasons why our data might cause us to reject the
investment hypothesis, though Mincer's theory might be a partial expla-
nation of earnings and the labor market. By 1955, the market might have
adjusted for expected wage changes that were not realized. However, if
forecasts are generally incorrect, it is difficult to consider how investment
models can ever be verified with either cross-section or time-series
samples; or more importantly, how such samples can be analyzed within
the context of equilibrium investment models.
Second, Mincer's formulation only applies to general on-the-job
training. We presented some evidence earlier that suggests that nongen-
eral training is important. No one has yet analyzed the implications of
firm-specific training on earnings profiles although some arrangements
must lead to rising profiles. However, we suspect that there is too much
uncertainty and lack of information, and too many barriers to competi-
tion to permit markets to function well.
SortingUncertainty and Hierarchy Models
Supposethat employers are uncertain about a person's productivity,
because performance depends on many skills, some of which are difficult
to test for in advance. The firm could let a person fill any job and use a
piecework system to pay him. But on most jobs, a piecework system is not
used because of the difficulty in measuring an individual's output and
because of the possibility of negative outputs associated with bad
decisions. An alternative procedure is to learn by observing. In this
model, firms initially place an individual in ajob which is an entry position
for one or more career paths. Then, firms make successive decisions to
fire, retain, or promote, on the basis of both the observed and required
competency in the particular position held.
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Ross has recently analyzed such a model, in which firms, who use an
expected discounted profit criteria, acquire information by sampling on
initial and subsequent assignments. In his model, he assumes that an
individual's skill level remains constant. But the solution of this model
indicates that on the average, earnings will rise with time on the job, even
though skills are not being created on the job."4
Without more information, it does not appear possible to specify the
optimal assignment path. Instead, we shall postulate a partial adjustment
model that is built up of several elements. The peak earnings a person can
earn can be represented as
(8)r=f(x)
wherex is a vector of inherited and acquired skills. Progress along a
career path can be represented as
(9)
Actual earnings in any year depend on random events and on perfor-
mance versus normal performance
(10)
If bisthe same along all ladders, then the coefficients of the X's should
change proportionately over time. However, there is every reason to
believe that some career ladders are steeper than others or that b varies.
Similarly, a can also vary by occupation.
While this model has certain similarities with the previous two, it yields
some different predictions. Consider first the R2 between Yand X. As in
the stochastic models, if U:aredistributed independently, the variance of
u will increase with t. To determine the change in R2 as people age, we
must examine the variance of the independent variables times their
coefficient in comparison with the growth of the variance of
1—0
Sincein our empirical work, we generally do not include the
estimated coefficients on the X's will be those implied by equation 9. This
equation can be written as In our equations the variance of the X's is
a constant as the people age, but the coefficients, and thus their
contribution to the variance of alter. It is possible, therefore, for the
R2 to increase or decrease as people age. As just noted, when the U's are
independent, this model postulates a growth in the residual variance in Y.
The model also indicates thatwill grow as people age, as long as the d's
have the same sign and increase with time.
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Nextlet us consider the change in earnings as people age. From
equation 10 we see that
(11)dY,/dtabY*[1/(T_ t)]2+ (1 —a)dY,_1/dt
which for most purposes we can treat as b[ Y*/(T_ t)}. As noted earlier, b
probably varies by career ladder or occupation. In general, we would
expect people who work in jobs such as manager and professionals to
have the highest b. Because the x's help determine the occupation a
person is in, we would expect that those x's which determinewould
influence b in the same direction.
Over a fourteen-year period (1 — canbe treated as close to
zero except for large Thus, ignoring the last term in (9), dYt
should be positively related to Y" and yN in 1955. It can be shown that
the percentage change in Yshould be independent of the 1955 value of Y.
However, the larger dY1_1 terms, which cannot be ignored, will be more
concentrated among those with the highest and lowest 1955 earnings.
Since the model indicates thatwill grow faster the more Y" exceeds
Y,_1, those with very low earnings would grow fastest over a fourteen-
year period.
Alternatively, the model could be expressed in terms of In Yin place of
Y. The only major difference in the above analysis is that the percentage
change of earnings from the equivalent of (9) would be dependent on b
and could vary by education, and other factors.
None of these predictions are contradicted by the results given in
previous chapters and used in the tests of the other theories. But since the
theory is not tightly specified, especially in comparison with Mincer's,
these tests are relatively weak. A more definitive test of this theory and
Mincer's could be made if more years of earnings were available, since the




Inour regressions, we have found a number of significant variables, many
of which have never been examined before. Nearly all of these variables
have the same sign in equations explaining earnings in widely separate
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years and also have what we consider to be consistent signs in equations
explaining educational attainment, test scores, and assets.
In the earnings equations, we find that educational quantity and
quality, mental ability, business assets, certain aspects of family back-
ground (discussed below), preferences towards risk and towards non-
monetary aspects of a job, locational information, hours of work, health,
and work experience and age are significant determinants of earnings.
Among this list of items are several, which, to my knowledge, have never
been found significant in earnings equations, partly because they have
never been studied. But the empirical results are in accord with economic
and social science theory. For example, economists and others have
long recognized that people can trade off earnings for nonpecuniary
rewards; but previously information on what nonpecuniary rewards are
traded off with earnings and the importance of such rewards were not
available.
Our family background variables are much different from those in most
other studies. For example, parents', or especially fathers', education and
occupation are often used as the major index of SES. Although we started
off using these variables, we found that they became insignificant,
especially when business assets were held constant. This suggests to us
that education and occupation act primarily as proxies for financial and
business inheritance, perhaps tinged with nepotism, and not for home
training. (Since parental education is associated with the educational
attainment and test scores of respondents, we are only speaking of direct
effects on earnings.)
While the traditional SES variables are not significant, we have found
others that seem to be related to the types of family life and child-rearing
processes that people have in mind when they talk of training and taste
formation. For example, we find that Jews earn significantly more than,
and Protestants significantly less than, Catholics (and the few atheists and
agnostics). Other studies have found that Jews of this and surrounding
generations have more drive and motivation for financial success.
Others, in small samples, have found that some Catholic groups—such
as German or French—do better than the average Protestant. Given
the education cutoff, in our sample and the cohort involved, it seems
likely that we have drawn Catholics from the above-average earnings
group.
Another aspect of religious upbringing that affects earnings is fre-
quency of attendance at religious (not parochial) school, with those
attending most often earning the least, and those never attending earning
the most. The ones who attended more than twice a week are probably
certain subgroups of Catholics and more Orthodox Jews. This variable
may help to distinguish those less interested in the material aspects of life.
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Thenonattendees are more difficult to explain although nonattendance in
the 1920s or early 1930s may represent a very atypical family.
We also find that those who attend private elementary school and high
school earn about $5,000 a year more in 1969. While there are a number
of explanations for this result, the one that appeals to us is that these
people come from very wealthy families who use pull to advance their
sons.
We also find that those who spent their time differently on various
activities while growing up earn different amounts. The explanations for
these findings include indication of respondents' tastes and attitudes as
well as certain types of family rearing. For example, we argued that
respondents who remembered spending time on chores came from
families that are interested in conformity and produce people who enter
into bureaucracies and safe jobs.
The more educated earn more although the graduate coefficients are
not always higher than the bachelor's coefficients.116 The effects of
education increase with age, and the age/earnings profiles are steeper for
education than for most other variables. However, in this sample, which is
stratified differently from the population and which has a truncated
distribution of education and ability, the (average) range in earnings
arising from education are dwarfed by the range arising from the
combination of SES variables, or of tradeoffs for nonpecuniary rewards,
and are only of the same magnitude as the range associated with mental
ability.
Mental ability has a continuous direct effect on earnings (as well as
indirect effects through educational attainment). The age/earnings
profile slope upward with only a tendency for the more able to have
significantly steeper profiles.
Risk premiums and nonpecuniary tradeoffs are also a greater
percentage of earnings as people age. Given the crudeness of measures
(zero, one dummies), it is not surprising that variables such as job security
and a preference to be salaried, both of which are related to risk
avoidance, have separate effects. Combining these different variables and
others such as chores and SES proxies into categories, the impression
conveyed is that those who take safe, unchallenging, and conventional
jobs fall progressively further behind in earnings. That is, the high-paying
jobs are at the top of certain career ladders and cannot be reached by
people on other ladders.
Time on the job is important especially early in a person's career,
but experience in some types of work is more transferable than in other
types. However, people generally do best when they do not switch occu-
pations. It also appears that hours worked is an important determinant
480 Taubmanof earnings (though the data are only available for 1969). However, there
are a large group of men who moonlight because their earnings are
low.
Business assets, as measured in 1969, are one of the most important
variables in our equation, by itself explaining 10 percent of the variance in
earnings. The coefficient is .12 in 1969, which is not extremely high on a
before-tax basis.
We have also calculated the same equations within various occupa-
tions. Since many of the above variables are related to occupational
choice, coefficients tend to be smaller and are significant less often. But
we do find clear evidence that some skills and attributes are more
important in some occupations than others. For example, intelligence is
more important for the self-employed. Moreover, the self-employed,
who have more control over their work environment, have larger
coefficients on the various nonpecuniary measures.
We can explain more of the variance in earnings in 1969 than in 1955,
even when we restrict our attention to variables equally accurate in both
years (i.e., when we ignore business assets, and so on). Second, the
truncated education variable has a partial R2 of about .05, though some of
the effects of education may be impounded in the nonpecuniary and other
variables. The biggest partial R2 in each year is attached to the 1969
business-asset variable. This result probably does not generalize to the
population, since we have a high proportion of self-employed, and
several with large amounts of business assets. The SES variables (includ-
ing all the time-spent variables) and the nonpecuniary variables (includ-
ing a preference to be salaried) each explain about 3 percent of the
variance in the two years.
Most of the variables have little or no effect on our relative skewness
and kurtosis measures. However, business assets, attending private
elementary and high school, the nonpecuniary variables, and the time
spent all reduce skewness and kurtosis sharply in 1969.
Methodology
Perhapsthe simplest way to describe the methodological advances we
have made is that many phenomena, skills, and attitudes that economists,
sociologists, biographers, and others have hypothesized as being related
to earnings, can be represented or captured by simple questions that can
be included in mail surveys. It seems likely that more systematic efforts
would allow us to incorporate many other skills, attitudes, and prefer-
ences, or to refine existing measures.
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Atthe beginning of this paper, there was a discussion of various theories,
hypotheses, and ideas that have been advanced to explain various
features of the distribution of earnings. Our empirical results do shed
some light on the validity and importance of many of these. For example,
Friedman suggested that skewness arose because of differences in risk
preferences. The variables which are related to risk preferences include
the preference to be salaried item, the entered occupation because of
job-security item, and the time spent on chores item.117 In each year, we
find that those wanting to avoid risk earn significantly less, and that the
differential grows with age and is a greater percentage of average earnings
(of high school graduates) as people age.
Avoidance of risk can be considered one type of nonpecuniary reward.
We find that tastes toward other types of nonmonetary returns also show
up as a reduction in earnings—presumably through the type of occupa-
tion in which a person chooses to work. We find that those who want
interesting work, or to help others, or who are not interested in future
financial success earn less, and that these differentials increase with age.
But these variables do not contribute to skewness and kurtosis.
We also find evidence that those who are willing to work hard or have
drive or concern for financial success receive greater earnings. These
conclusions are based on the effects of religion, part-time job while
growing up, and entrance in occupation because it (work) was challeng-
ing. These variables have larger effects over time.
These last several sets of results also suggest that models which
emphasize that training and taste formation (on earnings-related aspects)
occur in the family, religious institutions, and within peer groups have a
large grain of truth to them. However, the lack of significance of parental
education and occupation suggest that education is too crude an indicator
of the differences in upbringing.
Many people have argued that a good portion of earnings differentials
arise because of family pull. While we have no variable which is an
unambiguous measure of nepotism, we have several which lend them-
selves to that interpretation. This, for example, is the simplest explana-
tion of the in-laws education results, and of why the inclusion of business
assets wipes out the father's education coefficients. Nepotism and/or
inheritance of controlling interest in a business seem to be likely
explanations of why the 22 people who went to private elementary and
high school earn on average up to 50percentmore than people who went
to public or parochial school.
Some theories such as the one that goes under the general title of
human capital are more general in nature. To the extent that the human
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Icapital model means that people can improve their earnings capacity by
expending time and resources on schooling or informal training, we find
strong support in our analyses. The education coefficients are significant
and large. Certain types of family environment and childhood activities
are also significant. But the human capital model often is presented as one
in which people invest rationally, i.e., invest to the point where the rate of
return on the last dollar equals the cost of capital. This proposition is very
difficult to test, because many of the returns to education are of a
nonmonetary variety, have not been examined in this study, and are not
easy to convert into monetary equivalents.
Mincer, in a brilliant series of pieces, has demonstrated that if all
on-the-job training is general, if all returns to such training are in
monetary terms, and if the market functions as a competitive market
would, then the human capital model would predict at what age earnings
profiles would rise with age for investors; and that the more investment,
the steeper the profile. His model also predicts that the labor market
adjusts occupational wages so that the present discounted value of
lifetime earnings would be the same (to marginal choosers) in relevant
occupations. In its most general form, this theory is a tautology with, for
example, the amount invested in a year adjusting to make equations into
identities. But with restrictions the theory can be tested. We have
performed certain tests. We find evidence that is at variance with the
Mincer model unless certain correlations are postulated. We also find
some evidence that skills learned in one occupation may not be as
transferable to another occupation as homegrown skills. This suggests
that all training is not general.
We have also examined stochastic models. Since these can be rep-
resented as difference equations or Markov chains, it is also true that
these models can be used to explain any age profile of variance of earnings
as well as generating skewed models. But the most common stochastic
models assume that errors are uncorrelated. We find several pieces of
evidence at variance with this view. For example, the percentage change
in earnings from 1955 to 1969 is not independent of 1955 earnings level,
and the R2 of the systematic elements increases over time although the
stochastic model implies a decrease.
The sorting-uncertainty model, which we believe in, receives some
support from these findings. In part, this support is in the growth in
importance of the effects of education and ability, since these determine
potential earnings. Additional support comes from the growth in the
differentials associated with drive, risk aversion, willingness to work hard,
and so forth, as summarized above. That is, these subjective measures are
best displayed on the job. The differential of 1955 experience on 1969
earnings would be consistent with this model.
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Severaldifferent types of problem remain. First, our interpretation of
many of the new variables that we have used may be wrong. It would be
very useful for someone else, perhaps a psychologist or sociologist, to
test, validate, and improve our measures of risk aversion, eleemosynary
behavior, and so on. Second, we have spent very little time examining
interactions which may be very important and whose omission may be
biasing some of our results. Third, we have not related our various
cross-section periods to macro time-series development. Fourth, the
results are only generated within an atypical sample of a cohort, which in
turn may be atypical because of war experience and because of the
Depression, and because the economy and society are much altered now.
Thus, many of our findings must be subject to replication in other groups
before being accepted as not false. Finally, we have not made much
progress on the nature/nurture or genetic/environment explanations of
the distribution. Hopefully, progress on this issue will be forthcoming
soon.
APPENDIX:REGRESSIONS
TABLE A-iEarnings Equations for 1955 and 1969
Independent —1955 Earnings—— 1969 Earnings—
Variables Coefficientt-valueCoefficientt-value
Education
Somecollege —.21 1.0* —1 10 2.0
Bachelor's .13 .6* .16 3*
Some graduate work —.05 .2* —.01 .0*
Master's —.15 •5* 1.15 1.6*
Ph.D. +LL.B.+M.D. .22 •5* 2.52 2.6
LL.B. —.38 .8* 1.12 1.1
M.D. 3.49 5.3 4.13 2.9
Ability
2nd fifth .28 1.6 .54 1.4*
3rd fifth .31 1.9* .71 1.9*
4th fifth .56 3.3 1.40 3.7
5th fifth (top) .82 4.8 1.98 5.1
Biography
.21 1.5* .56 1.7*
Taubman
ITABLE A-i(continued)
Independent —1955 Earnings——1969 Earnings—
Variables Coefficientt-valueCoefficientt-value
4thflfth




Jewish 2.00 7.7 4.13 7.0
Protestant —.15 1.3* —.93 3.6
Attended religious school
often —.51 2.0 —1.14 2.0
Attended religious school
never —.01 .1* —.33 1.2*
Father-in-law H.S.+ .05 3.0 .10 2.7
Mother-in-law H.S.+ —.0.1 .1* .57 2.1
Time spent on sports .06 1.7* .26 2.9
Time spent on chores —.05 1.3* —.27 2.8
Time spent on hobbies .04 1.0* —.15 1.7*
Time spent on part-time
job .07 2.1 .29 3.8
Never moved before H.S. —.06 5* —.43 1.7*
Attended private high
school 1.49 3.9 2.80 3.3
Attended private elementary
school .23 3* 2.98 1.6*
Factors which influenced entering
occupation
Future financial prospects
(No= 1) —.54 4.2 —1.77 6.0
Independence (No =1) .27 2.1 1.19 4.1
Challenging work (No =1) —.76 5.0 —1.70 4.9
Help others (No =1) .48 3.8 .86 3.0
Jobsecurity(No=1) .48 4.0 1.41 5.2
Prefers to be salaried —.37 2.9 —1.00 3.4
Other assets (own business,
real estate), 1969 .03 11.5 .12 20.4
Self-employed businessman,
1969 .72 4.4 1.09 2.9
Self-employed, professional,
1969 .45 1.7* 3.30 5.5
Teacher, pre-college —.61 2.4 —1.86 3.1
Hours on main job, 1969 .07 4.7
Hours on second job, 1969 —.03 3.3 —.12 5.2











Weeks lost from illness,
1969 —.03 1.6* —.18 3.8
Mobile 1955 to 1969 .08 2.7 .33 5.1
Age .08 3.3 —.11 1.9*
Year of first job —.11 5.1 —.15 3.1
Current residence in town of
50,000 to 1,000,000 .46 3.6 1.09 3.7
Current residence in city in
excess of 1,000,000 .92 5.1 2.89 7.0
College quality
(Gourman rating) .0014 3.5 .0044 4.3
Weight, 1969 (100's of lbs.) 6.68 2.7 24.73 4.4
Weight-squared, 1969 —1.69 2.5 —6.45 4.2
Dummy for nonresponse in 1972 1.23 3.9 2.54 3.6
Constant .3" —7.74 1.2*
R2 .19 .32
Standard error 3.43 7.80
Degrees of freedom 4,548 4,547

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of moves within neighborhood when growing up
Type of house grew up in
Time spent reading
Why entered present job:
Salary or pay offered
Personal contacts
Provided a lot of free time
Retirement information
Military service after World War II
Length of service in military
Being the youngest and oldest child
Present health condition
Voting habits: frequency of participation in local, state, and national elections
Political self-concept: degree of conservativeness or liberalness
Opinion on extent of freedom of youth
Opinion on people's concern with financial security
Opinion on rate of racial integration in last 10 years
For the items listed below, how does your total work experience to date compare with
what you expected when you first started?
Requirement for independent judgment
Responsibility
Prospects for advancement
To what degree does success in your work depend on
Your own performance
Having the right connections
Being able to get along with people
Being lucky or unlucky
Having a college diploma
Working hard
Do you enjoy your work?









1.For international comparisons see Lydall (1968). For the U.S., see Miller (1966).
2.See, for example, Mincer (1970).
3.Even this need not be true. For example, different types of skills may be more or less
important depending on the types of machinery used.
4.Tinbergen (1959) has formulated this type of model and Reder has examined some
features of such a model though he uses somewhat different terminology. Indeed, the
usual general equilibrium models state that each individual is a separate factor of
production because he has his own bundle of skills.
5.Suppose, for example, the only twooccupationsare manager and manual worker and
that intelligence received such a high wage in managerial work that all people with an
1.0. above 110 are managers. Assume also that physical strength is of no importance
as a manager, but that among manual workers strength increases capacity while 1.0.
does not. Finally, assume that all those with I.Q. 's greater than 110 have above
average strength (though the correlation is not perfect). Then, for people with 1.0's
above 110, variations in strength would not affect earnings, while for those with
lower 1.0's and less strength, only variations in strength would affect earnings. Thus,
in this example, each skill is redundant in one occupation and only a portion of the
distribution of each skill determines earnings. This analysis, of course, suggests that it
may be necessary to examine earnings functions within occupations and that in the
whole sample the effect of a skill may have upper and lower limits.
6.Indeed, for some possible skills, appropriate measures have not yet been designed.
Perhaps the Terman sample (1959) contains the most information, but it is small and
limited to people with 1.0's (as children) of 140 and over. The Project Talent(1964)
and to a lesser extent the Little-Sewell (1958) samples have more skill information
for the period when their respondents were in elementary and high school, but
currently little in the way of earnings data, since the people graduated from high
school no earlier than 1958.
7.As equation1is written, allskills have an independent, linear effect. This
representation was chosen for simplicity. Interactions between skills should be not
assumed away in empirical work, especially because Roy (1950) has demonstrated
that if skills affect earnings multiplicatively, symmetric skill distributions yield
asymmetric earnings distributions—an important feature of the observed distribu-
tion. See also Mandelbrot (1962).
8.There is one other special case to note. It is possible that only skill differences relative
to the average matter, e.g., the brightest lawyer may receive twice as much per case as
the average lawyer. If all lawyers received more training and increased their legal
LifetimeDistribution of Earnings 491skills X percent, none might receive more earnings. However, the effect on earnings
of legal brightness between lawyers should be given by the coefficients in (1).
9.The genetic effect can be both direct and indirect. For example, a person's knowledge
level can depend on innate ability and on educational attainment, which is partly
determined by innate ability.
10.See for example Jinks and Fulker (1970), Burt (1971), Cavelli-Sforza (1971), or
Mittler (1971).
11.See Kagan (1971) for the last. Some of the former are discussed in Sewell and Shah
(1967).
12.See Crockett (1960).
13.For evidence on some noncognitive effects as well as the mechanism by which
education causes these changes see Simon and Ellison (1973).
14. A problem with many of these measures is that they seem more related to cognitive
development than to the other skills. However, certain information on type and size
of college may be related to noncognitive changes.
15.Alternatively, he has also suggested that people are risk averse to small changes but
are willing to gamble to achieve major gains.
16.There is no corresponding group of people with large losses because, as Lebergett
(1959) points out, the inept (risk lover) generally cannot raise as much financial
capital as the successful risk lover. Lebergett, in fact, presents some evidence that for
the non-self-employed the earnings distribution is nearly symmetric—though, of
course, this need not follow from the above model, since there are some risky salaried
occupations such as that of stockbroker.
17.For example, reasoning from personal introspection, some economists have thus
explained the low earnings (and rate of return on educational investment) for Ph.D.'s
and theologians.
18.It is possible, however, that tastes or the parameters of the utility function are partly
determined by family background or by education, in which case the extra earnings
attributed to, say, education are inadequate as a measure of the total returns to
education if tastes are also included in the equation. See, for example, McConnell in
Clark et al. (1972).
19.Much of the descriptive material is drawn from Taubman and Wales (1974), Chapter
4; and from B. Wolfe's dissertation (1973).
20.Thorndike and Hagen (1959), pp. 8 and 9.
21.Taubman (1975).
22.It is important to note that because of their vocational emphasis, much care and
attention was paid to assigning occupation codes. See their description on pp.
90—107.
23.The V.A. graciously provided new addresses at no charge. Additional updates were
obtained by checking phone books of the city of the last known address.
24.Initially, we had felt that 2,500 responses would have qualified this survey as a
success.
25.The NSF funds also enabled the NBER to extract more information from the TH
questionnaire, including the details on the job and earnings history.
26.For the post-1969 questionnaires we have adopted the practice of including a "no
response" dummy variable. Since this tends to be significant over time the more
successful are continuing to respond more.
27.This is a much better level of education than among World War II veterans—even if
we restrict ourselves to high school graduates. See Miller
28.The high percentage may also be due to the availability of V.A-guaranteed loans,
better financial position of parents and in-laws, or business competence.
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29.However, several of the highest ranking black Air Force generals in 1972 were in the
Air Cadet program in World War II.
30.The reader is reminded that TW rejected the hypothesis of a success bias over and
above the response bias by education and ability level.
31.However, the range and variance only indicate the direct effect of a variable. There
can also be indirect effects; for example, parental income can determine educational
attainment.
32Formally, if the true equation is Y= Xa + Z8 + u, whereuisa random variable, the
expected value of the ordinary least-squares estimate of 6 obtained when Zis
omitted is: E(a)= 8 + E(X'K)tXZS = a + f3ô. (3 isequal to the coefficient in
Z= Xj3. Thebias is j36whichis zero only if f3or6 is zero.
33.See, e.g., Simon and Ellison (1973) or McConnell in Clark et al. (1972) for some
evidence on the noncognitive developments.
34.These calculations assume that all post-high-school graduates attend a college of the
average quality of people who had only had some college. The quantity effects are
slightly larger when quality is omitted, but never by more than $200.
35.If self-employment variables were not included, the increases would be: 14 percent
for some college; 28 percent for bachelor's; 80 percent for LL.B.; and 110 percent
for M.D. These increases are less than those given in TW, primarily because of the
introduction of self-employment variables, though the graduate level coefficients
were much smaller before we introduced some variables related to nonpecuniary
returns. Essentially, the same percentage increases are obtained from equations
using the log of earnings. If we adopt Mincer's 1973 model, these percentage changes
divided by the associated number of years of education beyond high school are an
estimate of the rate of return from education which is less than 6 percent at all
education levels.
36.When the self-employment information is omitted, the 1955differentialsare: some
college 11 percent; bachelor's degree 14 percent; LL.B. 14 percent and M.D. 82
percent, which are very close to those given in TW.
37.However, the variable could mean that on some unmeasured aspect of ability,
teachers are less able.
38.This is described in more detail in Chapter 4 in Taubman (1975).Becausethe index is
scaled arbitrarily, we initially included it and its square in the equations. Since these
two terms together are never significant and do not explain more of the variance of
earnings than the linear term, we use only the linear term.
39.The introduction of the quality variable causes a 5percentto 10 percent reduction in
the coefficients of the Jewish, year of first job, attendance at private high school, and
attendance at private elementary school variables, as well as a 10 percent increase in
the precollege-teacher dummy in 1969 and smaller changes in 1955. The quality
index may still be acting as a proxy for unmeasured attributes but we would hope that
it in part measures the extra value added imparted by better schools.
40.No attempt was made here to reinvestigate the usefulness of the other factors. Since
we convert the test score data into dummy variables for the different fifths of the
factor score distribution, we are assuming that post-test-taking events (not otherwise
measured) do not change the fifths of the ability distribution a person would belong
to in each of the particular years studied.
41.Since people had to be in the top half of the Air Cadet General Test (ACGT) to be
able to volunteer for the program, these fifths are more like tenths.
42.If this is true, equation is Y= a(innate ability) +bX, butwe estimate Y= a*(innate
ability +cX) + b*X,then our least-squares estimate of a* and b*areidentical for
those for a and b— ac.
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and navigator school. l'his is a wider list than that used in most previous studies, and
some of the variables require justification as SES measures. Almost all of these
variables are significant in both 1969 and 1955. Several of the variables have been
used at one time or another by others; see, for example, Blau and Duncan (1967) and
Sewell and Shah (1967).
44.The original items, which were collected by the military, are not extant though much
information has been re-collected in 1969 and 1972.
45.This also suggests that the business asset variable reflects inheritances or nepotism
rather than the cumulative effect of education, arising out of extra earnings.
46.In 1969 the respondents were asked to indicate their religious preference by
checking one of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, None, Other. It is possible that
different answers would have been obtained if "the religion you were raised in" was
asked. Compared to the U.S. white population, the NBER-TH had 1.7 percent more
of both Jews and Others and 5percentfewer Catholics. However, the differences
from white males in the particular cohorts who were at least high school graduates
would probably be smaller.
47.If self-employment and M.D. are not held constant, Jews earn even more. The asset
variable is measured imperfectly, but it is difficult to attribute a difference of $4,000 a
year to this.
48.In a study of college graduates of the first half of the century, Hunt(1963) also found
similar qualitative results. Also using the same basic data source, Haveman and West
(1952) found that being Jewish was the most important determinant of earnings of
people who graduated from college in the first half of this century. Featherman
(1971) also found Jews to earn more and some Catholics, such as French, to earn
more than the average Protestants. Both the Hunt and Featherman studies hold
constant education and mental ability as well as other variables.
49.For example, Eckland (1965) finds that for given test scores and social class, Jews go
to higher quality institutions of learning. This would indicate either higher tastes for
education, more motivation and drive, or lower costs relative to returns. He also finds
that certain ethnic groups of Catholics do better than the average Protestants. Given
the education cutoff in the Air Force program, it seems likely that our Catholics come
largely from these successful ethnic groups.
50.We also cannot rule out the possibility that the Jews and other non-Protestants are a
more select group of their respective populations. However, given the nature of the
Air Force work they volunteered for, it might be argued that those who volunteered
could include more people who wanted to gain revenge on Germany or quickly inflict
destruction in large doses. However, the revenge motive would seem to suggest that
Jews and, to a lesser extent, Catholics would be a more random (less select) group of
their religious compatriots with respect to the characteristics that determine earn-
ings.
51.1 is for practically no time spent and 5isfor the most time spent.
52.If we are right about the type of families that these men came from, we would expect
them to have a high rate of time preference, and less access to capital early in their
lives; thus, we would find it hard to interpret the growth in earning over time as an
investment theory, as in Mincer.
53.Related to this last viewpoint is the idea that people who play sports may be more
able to make decisions quickly. If intellectualism is taken as evidence of the opposite
personality, it is interesting that the Phi Beta Kappa's among top management earn




54.There are, however, several caveats that must be attached to this conclusion. First,
father's occupation (and resulting income) has an indirect effect on earnings through
the amount of schooling the respondent receives. Second, and more importantly,
father being an owner is significant when the self-employment variables are not
included. Third, in 1968 the father's occupation and education have a much greater
impact on the range in family incomethanon earnings of the head. This suggests that
income inequality is perpetuated through generations directly through financial
inheritance (including business assets) and indirectly through educational attain-
ment. The biography variable also includes some parental wealth indicators, though
it is not clear what aspects of the variable determine earnings.
55.Indeed, when we include a crude measure of net worth in our equations, the private
school variables become insignificant and much smaller. Since private schooling is
both different from public schooling and more costly to the respondent's parents, it
might be argued that these results are due to quality differentials. But if this argument
is accepted, it is difficult to explain why in Taubman (1975) neither type of private
school is significantly related to our ability measure, which contains some learned
knowledge.
56.Dummy variables for father-in-law's occupation and spouse's education are not
significant.
57.This only includes items in Table 3. Business assets and some other variables may be
partly determined by SES.
58.The ones not significant had small coefficients in both years (though smaller in 1955),
but we explain more of the earnings variance in 1969. Since (X'X) is nearly the same
in the two years, the variance of the coefficients relative to the size of the coefficients
is smaller in 1969. Presumably, similar reasoning explains why some of the education
coefficients are not significant in 1955.
59.It is also possible that age is a proxy for particular cohorts. While most people in the
survey are within 7 years of one another, the youngest people did not begin work till
after serving in the military, whereas many of the older people began work befoi1e
World War II.
60.Also, we have not included those with zero earnings, which would include those (if
any) retired or unemployed for mental or physical health reasons.
61.The ranking of occupations is about the same in all years; hence, if you are going lobe
a manager in 1969, you should choose to be one earlier if you have the option.
62.Earnings= &Earnings/aW=H(1+o-) where 0= While this is
the usual way of viewing the problem, our equations relate Earnings to H.
aEarnings/8H= W(1 +1/oP).With backward-bending supply curves, 0 might be
negative.
63.Part of this earnings increase represents the substitution of material goods for leisure.
Unfortunately, the hours data, which were only collected in 1969, do not mesh
perfectly with the earnings data, since the earnings in 1969 are those on main job
only, while we have separate estimates for hours on first and second job. However,
the 1968 earnings data, which include second job, give similar results, so that this
caveat need not be important.
64.An additional question was asked in which "about the same" was replaced with
"slightly favorable if you worked for yourself." This second question was never
significant given the first, but the first question always yielded significant coefficients
in the earnings equations of various years.
65.These examples all assume that risk preference is a trait which is exhibited in all
activities. This assumption may be wrong. For example, some college professors may
be risk lovers in the field of ideas but risk averters in other matters.
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66.The factors examined were: salary offered, prospects of eventual financial success,
chance to do interesting work, chance for independent work, chance for a lot of
person-to-person contact, chance to help others, represented a challenge, job
security, and provided a lot of free time. We did not examine type of training in
school, type of training in military, personal contacts, or always liked that kind of
work.
67.The denominator, as usual, is the earnings of the average non-self-employed high
school graduate. If the current salary variable answer is included, the coefficient is 10
percent.
68.For those who want to try to replicate these findings in other studies, it is important to
note that several of the variables, e.g., independence, and helping others, were not
significant by themselves but became significant after the financial prospects variable
was added to the equation.
69.For a few of these variables, the answers may represent an individual's recognition of
his own limitations. For example, those who like to help others may not have the
aggressiveness to be successful managers. In such a case, the variable represents skills
that determine earnings.
70.It also includes nonresidential real estate and other nonspecified items. The variable
is crude, since people were only asked to check one of eight categories including
"don't have" and "over $80,000."
71.This interpretation, however, may be wrong for several reasons. Consider the results
obtained from regressing a person's earnings which equal wage income plus returns
from capital (assuming that education, etc., is held constant by sample design). That
is, we regress W +rkcK. The expected value of c would be equal to +rK)
(K)/1K2 =r+ If wage income and business assets are not correlated
(linearly) the coefficient on K will be an unbiased estimate of the returns from capital,
but if people with more capital also have higher wage rates (education, etc., constant)
then c is biased upwards as an estimate of r.
72.Also, the asset variable must be measured with error, since people only checked
categories into which their assets fell, and because the data were taken from an item
in which real estate holdings could be included with the business assets. Christensen
(1970) has argued that because unincorporated businesses do not have to pay the
corporate income tax, a 7 percent to 10 percent return is consistent with the 15
percent before-tax return made by corporations.
73.See Lydall (1968) or Kravis (1962) for surveys of other samples. Lebergett (1959)
suggests that among males working full time who are not self-employed, the earnings
distribution in 1959 approaches normality. For some purposes, however, the
self-employed and unemployed should be included in the earnings distribution.
74.There is little direct evidence on the distribution of capacity. 1.0. scores, for example,
are generally scored so as to be normally distributed.
75.For an excellent summary of all these models, see Mincer (1970).
76.See Atkinson (1970), Mincer (1970), Kravis (1962).
77.See Atkinson (1970).
78.The education and ability groups are those defined above.
79.We shall assume that the expected values of the first four moments can be estimated
from the actual value. This need not be true. For example, if the distribution were
Pareto, the expected value of the variance would be infinite though a number could
be obtained from the data.
80.To insure comparability with the regression results, and to save on costs, the 1955
and 1969 statistics are based on the approximately 4,600 people who reported
earnings in both years.
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the log-normal, The skewness and kurtosis results for the log of earnings in Table 6
are not consistent with the null hypothesis that earnings in 1955 and 1969 are
distributed in log-normal fashion. Given our earlier results on (nonintersecting)
Lorenz curves and Atkinson's theorems, the coefficients of variation and the
standard error, which are measures of inequality, must increase.
82.Careful analysis of nationwide random samples has generally resulted in the
conclusion that the earnings do not follow the log-normal distribution for high levels
of income, but probably because of the restricted distribution of education, mental
ability, and age in our sample, the deviations from the log-normal case (on a chart not
shown) are greater and occur over a wider range of earnings in this sample.
83.It is well known that such samples yield unbiased estimates of the a's. Thus we can use
the equations we have developed to examine the effect of the various X's on earnings
for the range of each X in the sample.
84.Since most of our variables are "zero, one" dummies, our coefficients are estimates of
the mean in various cells. Provided our model specifications—including interaction
and homoscedasticity—are correct, the residuals represent the distribution within
various cells and can be used to study skewness and kurtosis.
85.For example, suppose that the variable being considered is a "zero, one" dummy
variable, Z.The"ones" in the Zvariablecould all be located just so that eliminating
the effect of Zwouldeliminate completely any (nonnormal) kurtosis in the earnings
distribution. Since most of our variables have been transformed into dummy
variables, the effects of, say, schooling depend on the distribution of people by
education level and their coefficients.
86.See Kendall and Stuart (1961).
87.However, part of the effects of, say, education maybeappearinginothercoefficients
whose variables are partially determined by education.
88.All the moments in Table 3 are calculated about the mean that applies to each
row.
89.The reduction in isabout 50 percent.
90.This increase is partly due to the distribution of people iii each category, e.g., nearly
rectangular over the education groups and in the ability and SES instances, and
partly to the pattern of the coefficients.
91.We have already subtracted 3 which is the value if the distribution is normal. The
unstandardized measure of kurtosis, woulddecline substantially, but even with
the initial variance, the distribution would not be normal.
92.The major difference between the 1969 and 1955 results for the self-employment
variables may well be due to the measurement problem, i.e., some in the right-hand
tail in 1955 are no longer self-employed in 1969, while some with large business
holdings in 1969 were not yet self-employed.
93.There are from 950 to 1,330 people in each cell.
94.The criteria used may vary depending on supply of the "best" groups relative to total
demand.
95.There can still be a wide variance within, say, education groups, because initial
position obtained may depend on nepotism, being at the right place at the right time,
or because of the importance of subjective criteria.
96.Wise (1972) has examined the effects of such a system on the variance of earnings,
using a Markov model.
97.Pay does not increase linearly with position. See Lydall (1968). For some specific
evidence on corporate executives see Taubman-Wales(1974), Chapter 8, Appendix
L.
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-I98.There are not exactly 10 percent of the sample in each row or column for two reasons.
First the dividing points were found for all respondents with nonzero earnings in the
sample, while some individuals were not included in this table, primarily because
they did not report earnings in both years. Secondly, in a few instances, a large
number of people reported earnings equal to the dividing point. While we could
randomly allocate people to each adjoining class to fill it, it was simpler and not
misleading to place people in only one class.
99.Some of this difference may reflect attenuation, since those in the bottom tenth
cannot fall but can rise in 1969, etc. In all but one comparison, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test would reject the hypothesis that each row is distributed the same as
its adjacent rows.
100.In this section we use nominal earnings rather than the constant dollar ones used
earlier. This change is made because the determination of the cutoff points was done, RI.
earlyon, in current dollars. Deflation would not change the pattern or conclusions.
101.There is, however, a tendency in each of the tables for the average compound growth
rate to decrease with 1955 earnings, partly because of the wider variance in growth
rates at the higher 1955 percentiles.
102.We have expressed the on-the-job training variable in this way to be in accord with
Mincer's model, as explained below.
103.It can be demonstrated that if we compare the estimates of Y= Xd +Ze and
Y =Xf+ (Z + Xb)gthatour estimates of g and e would be identical, while the
estimate of fwouldequal that of d —bg.
104.This may be because the 1969 earnings are only for the main job, while the 1955
earnings may include all jobs. However, this variable seems to represent those
people with low wage rates who work hard. Thus it may represent some of the same
forces in 1955.
105.Even if this alternative explanation is accepted, Mincer's theory may be correct in a
formal sense. Lifetime earnings within career ladders can be adjusted so that they are
the same net of risk premiums and nonpecuniary rewards. But even here, the
increase in earnings need not be due to on-the-job training but could solely reflect
the firm's learning by observation, although a combination of the two learning
mechanisms seems more likely.
106.See Mincer (1970) for an interesting survey and analysis of these theories. The
original work in this area is due to Aitchison and Brown (1957), Champernowe
(1953), Rutherford (1955), and Mandelbrot (1962). Various assumptions about the
distribution of the e's and about the validity of equations (1) or (la) can lead to a
normal, log-normal, Pareto, or other distributions.
107.The stochastic-processes theories also provide no explanation of why age earnings
profiles slope upward or why the steepness of the profiles varies with education.
108.Those with high earnings in 1955alsohave distributions with fatter tails for which the
theory offers no explanation.
109.Unless the individual variation in OJT is perfectly correlated with some measured
variables.
110. may be very negative and (rK, —not a large enough positive number to offset
Second,both terms may be moderately negative; and third, rK, —I,may be a
large negative andnot large enough positive to offset it.
111.About half of the high school graduates and one-third of the some-college group
began work before 1942.
112.However, since 10 percent of the people received more education after 1955, the
education variables are a bit different.
113.This tends to happen in the compound growth rates but the differences are not
significant.
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- . ___,_.i 4114.Of course,a personmay exercise only certain skills when he reaches particular rungs
on the ladder. But in this model the person always had the skill, and it was not created
on the job.
115.For example, if a =.1,(1 —a)'4is less than .2.
116.The inclusion of various nonpecuniary and attitude variables generally raises the
coefficients on graduate education.
117.Our argument is that the people came from homes that bred conformity.
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In an era of burgeoning interest in microeconomic data and analysis, and an
exploding supply of data, the NBER-Thorndike data set clearly has an important
place. It starts, of course, with a selected group who: (a) applied during 1943 for
an Army Air Force pilot, bombardier, and navigator training program, (b) passed a
screening test, (C) took a battery of tests after preliminary acceptance, and
replied to a mail questionnaire in 1955.1 And the 1 969foIIow-upfurther selected
those: (a) with good addresses, and who (b) were willing to return a much more
comprehensive questionnaire (5,100 of them). Still smaller subsets provided
further information in 1971 and 1972 (3.000, 4,474). If we described them as
brighter, physically tougher, risk taking, probably more successful than average,
and still alive and cooperative, we should not be far off.
Second, we need to keep in mind that things are measured at different points
in time. Taubmari carefully points this out during the paper, but one must always
worry about the extent to which reports in 1972 about why one chose an
occupation twenty years earlier may be affected by how successful one was in
that occupation.
The analysis is really four analyses, one of earnings levels in 1955 and 1969,
one of the distribution (inequality, variance, skewness, and kurtoSis), one of the
trends between 1955 and 1969 in individual incomes, and one of the possibility
of testing of certain theories about reasons for inequality.Itis not easy to
summarize all this.
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First, earnings levels: With such a rich body of data, and with no single theory to
serve as guide (no theory in some areas, and competing theories in others), the
author is justified in doing some ransacking. He does it by a sequence of
regressions, eliminating things that do not seem to matter, even in multiple
regression analyses simultaneously with the obvious other variables, as, for
example, education.
What mattered? Education of course, and in a nonmonotonic way—as we
have usually found in out analyses. Finishing something like high school or
college is what matters. (Perhaps credential effects are more importantthanwe
admit?)
Occupation matters, and reduces the apparent importance of education when
it is introduced. The quality of the college matters. And a mental ability test
matters, even in the regression with education, and without any apparent
interaction with educaton. Family background matters, but it seems to be more a
matter of wealth than father's education. The Jews, and to a lesser degree
Catholics, do better, even controlling for education (including a dummy variable
for M.D. degrees). And some reports on how time was spent when growing up
seem to matter, part-time jobs and sports positively, hobbies and chores
negatively. Going to a private high school pays off, as do the education of
father-in-law and mother-in-law, a result interpreted as nepotism.(Ihave
another interpretation.) Among the things that did not matter were birth order,
growing up on a farm, region, and so on.
Business assets have a powerful effect on the respondents "earnings," but
may only reflect the difficulty in separating labor earnings from a return on capital
in one's own business. A larger proportion than average of these people were
self-employed.
And of course, age and work hours affect earnings.
Interesting comparisons and reassuring confirmations come from doing this
analysis for both 1955 and 1969, even though some of the variables were only
measured in 1969, and a few only later in 1972 (reasons for occupational
selection). Such confirmation is at least a partial substitute for searching half the
data and assessing a final model on the other half.
Finally, some attitudes toward risk and nonmonetary aspects of a job,
(measured in 1972 by asking about reasons for choosing an occupation much
earlier) were related to earnings.
The results are presented in the form of percentage differences from some
"standard" group, with t tests.
COMMENTS ON THE ANALYSIS OF EARNINGS
I have no objections to ransacking, and do a lot of it myself.I am concerned,
however, with the use of a single-stage linear model in this situation. It seems
likely, and some theories even call for it, that the factors affecting earnings are
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relationships but not of interaction effects.) Some interaction checks were
made, mostly for levels of ability, and by rerunning regressions for some
occupation groups.
More important, we do not have here a single-stage causal path, but
something calling for a more systematic attention to the possible causal paths.2
The inclusion of occupation and education l.Q. in the same regression
(which we all tend to do) can be taken as a simple example. If education is an
essential prior requirement for some occupations, and there is little later formal
education, then our analysis should not assess their influence simultaneously,
but attempt to answer one of two questions: Is there anything about occupa-
tional choice that explains earnings over and above its role as the channel
through which education works? (For this, we need the partial correlation of
occupation with earnings.) Is there anything about education that affects
earnings over and above what could be explained by occupation? (For this, we
need the partial correlation of education with earnings.) And since both have
nonlinear effects and/or no neat metric, assessing marginal contributions really
requires rerunning whole sets of dummy variable regressions.
The sociologists have recently leapfrogged over most economists in the
development of more sophisticated procedures for analyzing data, borrowing
from Sewall Wright, a geneticist, and his "path analysis."3 If wewere to analyze
the present problem in their terms, we might have a diagram like Figure 1. Not
only does such a diagram reveal problems like the dangers of simultaneous use
of sequential explanatory forces, but it also alerts us to such other possible
difficulties as: (a) the possibility that the attitudes (reasons for occupational
selection) reported in 1972 might have been the result of success ratherthan its
FIGURE 1Paths of Influence Leading to Earnings
NOTE:Exogenous forces affect each of the variables, and are customarily indicated by
arrows coming to them from empty space. I have left them off for simplicity. The
system is recursive—no feedback arrows, though some could be iustified.






cause or may work through other things; (b) the possibility that what appears to
be an effect of well-educated in-laws may reflect mate selection and the
individual's own background and ambition, rather than nepotism.
Even path analysis makes restrictive assumptions, the most powerful, of
course, being that of recursivity—no feedback loops to demand structural
equation models. And most path analysis has to assume measurability and
linearity, or at least some uniform arbitrary scaling of categorical variables. It is
not the statistics but the attention to modeling the world that is important.
The additivity assumption is, however, also a problem. And spelling out the
possible effects of combined extremes on whole sets of predictors is probably
an exaggeration. Indeed, it is testably so. One should look at the cases which
combine such extremes and examine their residuals. I submit that they would
prove nonadditivity—by being mostly less extreme than the additive model
predicts.
I am particularly concerned with the use and interpretation of 1972 reports on
reasons for occupational selection to explain 1955 and 1969 incomes. It is quite
possible that attitudes are far more the result of economic experience than a
cause of it. We're looking at our own panel data now to check this.
Finally, while there are various caveats about the meaning of both occupa-
tion and education, let me reinforce them. What does an occupational title
represent? It can represent salary, responsibility, education required, training,
supervision of others, whether supervised and by how many levels, skills, clean
or dirty work (white collar), size of organization, type of industry (farmer),
prestige, whether you serve others personally, whether on annual salary,
amount and kind of capital equipment used, entrepreneurial activities, work for a
government, and in the words of Eliot Jacques, how often you are evaluated by
others.
If it shrewdly incorporates many of these, it should, of course, relate well to
earnings. We find it difficult to keep coders from looking at earnings when they
categorize occupations! Sociologists' occupation scales are based on correla-
tions with earnings and education, so if we use those codes we are likely to
reproduce their methods, just as analysis of quarterly time series may rediscover
the seasonal adjustment.
And education has problems of spurious correlation with things other than
investment in human capital. It can represent self-selection by perseverance,
willingness to hew to the line, ambition, or selection by others by obedience,
memory, adulation, intelligence, or acquired knowledge, or even acquired skills
(physical, cognitive, psychological, or affective). It can represent simple correla-
tion with parental background, inheritance, standards, or actual help, or the
friends met in school and later help from them. It can even mean credentials
which are substantively meaningless but open a lot of doors. In other words,
attributing earnings to education is probably always a somewhat fruitless and
dangerous undertaking. We have no adequate natural experiments, only spuri-
ous correlations.
Finally,I must urge that we have results presented in forms closer to the
original data. Coefficients representing percent difference (logs) from some
excluded group are affected by the earnings of that excluded group, as are the
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t-tests. What we want are departures from average and the significance of
those. There is no reason why dummy variable regressions cannot be presented
in that form. What the reader really needs is the unadjusted subgroup means for
each dummy variable subclass, such as religious group, the adjusted coefficients
or means, the subgroup frequencies, and some measure of the importance of
the whole set of subclasses. For the unadjusted, gross effect, the correlation
ratio, beta-squared, is clearly the appropriate measure of importance. We have
been using an analogue for the adjusted coefficients, which is also analogous to
the partial beta coefficient (the normalized regression coefficient if one thinks of
the coefficients as a new scale, scaling a variable called religion). If the adjusted
coefficients are in the form of deviations from the grand mean (have a weighted
sum of zero instead of having one coefficient constrained to zero) then it is easy
to assess their individual significance, since it is largely affected by the number of
cases in that subgroup and the overall standard deviation (reduced if the multiple
R-squared is large). But t-tests of individual coefficients expressed as deviations
from an excluded class are difficult to interpret. It is useful to see both the gross
and net effects, to see what the adjustment for I ntercorrelation by the regression
actually does. Sometimes, the effect of a predictor is greater after the adjust-
ments, indicating a spurious lack of association in the crude data.4
When we compare R-squares from regressions explaining the log of earnings,
what are we doing? True, extreme cases may affect things, but models which
seem best with logs can differ from those which explain the actual earnings best.
Which brings me, because it is related, to an even more difficult statistical
problem, that of weighting. Logs are a kind of weighting, emphasizing the
importance of differences at the lower end of the scale. Several times the author
argues that weights for differential sampling or response rates are not required
because unequal weighting will not affect the unbiasedness of coefficients
estimated from the data. This is true only/f the model is correctlyspecified, and
our models are never correctly specified. We have rather good evidence that
failure to use weights makes appreciable differences in coefficient estimates
even in generally accepted models.
DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS
A second strand of analysis deals with variance, skewness, and kurtosis, finding
the distributions not log-normal, but with skewness, and stretched-out-tails
(platykurtic). Between 1955 and 1969, variance increased more than the mean;
skewness and kurtosis got smaller.If one looks at residuals from various
regressions, all three, of course, get a little smaller, but not much. The failure of
the regressions to reduce skewness reraises the possibility of nonaddivities.
One difficulty in comparing skewness and kurtosis between years, and between
original data and residuals, is that most of us have no intuitive sense for the size
of sampling errors or third and fourth moments. I have the uneasy feeling that
most of the differences are random and do not call for much sophisticated
explanation. The apparent finding that what the author calls the "self-
employment variables" reduce variance and skewness most when their effect is
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removed, may well be the removal of the effects of business assets in a few
extreme cases, where there is a conceptual problem to boot, that 'earnings" are
partly a return to capital.
Some of Taubman's speculation about late recognition of talent is potentially
testable by seeing whether the relative importance of ability compared with
education is greater in 1969 than in 1955. Such a comparison is made difficult by
the absence of any way of looking at the importance of sets of dummy variables,
as distinct from the range of their coefficients.I recommend to users of such
regression the partial beta analogue we use, or else the actual calculation of the
partial A-square for each crucial set of predictors, by rerunning the regression
without that set and then looking at (R-square full—R-square without)/(1 —A-
square without), which estimates the partial R-square.
However, in our experience, the analogue to the partial beta coefficient
(normalized regression coefficient) is close enough and can easily be calculated
from the dummy variable regression material.
TRENDS IN EARNINGS
The third section deals with trends in earnings for individuals from 1955 to 1969,
taking maximal advantage of the panel data. :Starting with transition matrices,
and with such matrices separately for different levels of education, several
regressions are presented where the dependent variable is the percent increase
in income (Y69 — Y55)/ Y55. The initial income is used as one of the explanatory
variables in some regressions, representing "the effects of all the unmeasured
variables." Our interpretation would be different—namely, that we are really
looking at regression, in the old-fashioned sense of that term, and of two types:
real and statistically spurious, resulting from errors in measurement.
In general, and this has been our experience, too, it proves to be difficult to
explain changes in earnings. Change is mildly associated with ability, and with
education (at these upper levels of education), and with a number of the same
variables that explained level. The R-squares are deceptively large, of course,
because of the lagged dependent variable format—Y— 1 as a "predictor"; we
need a more modest estimate of how much of the change we have explained'
The author then goes on to examine whether some of the results can be
simplified and interpreted as reflecting a single effect, such as investment in
on-the-job training.
Change is found to be related to education, having gone to a private
elementary school, minority religion (though there is a disturbing inconsistency
in the "Jewish" effect depending on which equation was used), engaging in
sports or work as a youth, not doing chores (farm background?), and self-
employment.
The data do not seem to be easily interpretable as differences in on-the-job
training (Mincer), and the author suggests they may represent choices of careers
with more risk and more payoff, and a sorting over time for those who take the
risks.5
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Studying change separately from level is always a difficult task. Attempts to
assess experimental programs have recently made this even more clear.
Change and level are intimately related in fact, and in statistical artifact. Let us
take statistical artifact first. The term regression arose because of a discovered
tendency for things subject only to random shocks to appear to regress toward
the mean. In other words, any individual whose initial measure was unusually
high (low) tended to move down (up) subsequently. If the initial departure was a
measurement error, then the regression was a spurious result of measurement
problems. If the departure was real (the result of some shock), then a real
regression phenomenon was occurring, but neither of these reflect long-term
real differences in trends. The problem is exacerbated, of course, by taking
increases as a percent of the initial year. If two people whose normal income is
$10,000 have initial incomes, from random shock or measurement error, of
$5,000 and $15,000, respectively, one has a 100 percent increase and the other,
a 33 percent decrease. And if on the average there are increases, those with
initial low levels will have larger percentage increases.
Using the initial level as one of the predictors is Taubman's solution. It is
equivalent to using both the level and the square of the initial level to explain the
change, and all othervariables shiftthatre/ationbyafractionof theinitial level. In
some of our work, we take the change as a percent of the middle years, or as a
percent of the average (beginning and end) years. Even better, perhaps, would
be to find the relationship of change to average level, and explain the deviations
from that, since even our measure tends to have some remaining (usually
positive) relation to level.
Take the interpretation of education: People whose education was high
relative to their 1955 earnings had a larger increase in earnings. Is this anything
more than "regression to the mean" again? And is this why age seems to have
an effect?
Finally, why do the results vary so much across the four equations?
TESTING THEORIES OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The final section of Taubman's paper asks whether some of the simpler
theories of income-distribution dynamics fit the data. It is a valiant attempt, since
as the author points out, most theories are not easily refuted, being so general
that with some adjustments they can fit almost any set of data—like the
"permanent income hypothesis." They are a way of looking at data rather than a
testable proposition. But by imposing some additional reasonable assumptions,
it can be shown that the data do not fit a stochastic theory of independent
random changes in earning levels (the R-squared increases from 1955 to 1969,
and there is a correlation of change with level).
The on-the-job training theory, or a variant which simply talks about willing-
ness to trade a low start for a promise of more rapid increases in earnings later, is
examined by assuming that 1955 may represent the "overtaking point," and that
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1969 may represent the peak earnings year. In this case the R-square should be
largest in 1955, when the "investments in job training" are least distorting. (It is
assumed that anyone who earns less than expected is investing the difference in
job training, something which surely must take some prize for special interpreta-
tion of data.) Since R-square does go up rather than down, the data do not fit this
theory better, either. The author concludes that markets may not function that
well, even for this special upper-level population.
Finally there are sorting-uncertainty models, even more difficult to test. In
general, the author concludes, we may need a collection of theories and
explanations to fit the complex world in which we live.I agree.
FOR ALL FOUR PARTS
Ihave some strong feelings about presentation of data. We need better
estimates of the explanatory power not of individual subgroups of explanatory
characteristics—such as one occupational class—but of each characteristic as a
whole. We want to know how much education matters, for instance.
And we all need to cast a wider net when we search for the reasons why our
measured variables make a difference. A significant relationship can have a
variety of explanations. Ultimately the proof of any one explanation must consist
of discrediting all the alternative explanations of the same relationship. There
had not been time today to engage in that exercise extensively, but the kind of
data we have here surely invite it.
In summary, Ireally think that the analysis of earnings levels needs a model
that pays more attention to levels of causation, to explanatory variables that can
affect other explanatory variables but that cannot be affected by them, in other
words, directional relationships. And the analysis of changes in earnings needs
to face up, in addition, to the problems of separating level from trend. This is a
discouraging road, of course, since we can explain level a lot better than
changes. I am not convinced that studies of the higher moments of distributions
are useful, except as indicators that our additive models are not working (orthat
some better transformation of the dependent variable is called for). And finally,
we must all come to terms with the strategy of research.Are we actually testing
models or engaging in what Ed Learner calls "Post Data Model Construction"?
And if we are doing the latter, with any ingenuity whatever, even the most
sophisticated methods of penalizing ourselves for looking at the data are not
likely to suffice.
I suggest that we develop some protocols about research reporting which
require that the author clearly state whether he is constructing models (has run
more than one regression), or is testing some particular model or set of models.
If the latter is the case, Taubman's exercise in asking what in the data could
possibly refute a particular model is a good example. But it is also revealing, in
that most theories and models are not testable without imposing additional
assumptions.
Given the rich bodies of microdata becoming available, and the ransacking
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capacity that some of us have been developing on computers, I predict an
explosion of 'findings" and a rediscovery of what other social sciences have
long since found, that the "aha" factor can lead to many 'significant," but
contradictory, findings. We can reduce the confusion if we all make clear what
we are doing, but we really should ransack only part of the data, and use the
other part to fit and test the preferred model that resulted from the searching
process.
NOTES
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This is a partial comment on Taubman's paper in response to the section entitled
"Investment in On-the-Job Training Models" (in Section VI), which purports
to test a job-training theory ascribed to me. I will not elaborate on a number of
perhaps unavoidable shortcomings in Taubman's brief summary of this model,
as my actual detailed specification and analysis are now available to the reader in
the monograph Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, published by the NBER in
1974, just after this Conference. It will suffice to stress several points which are
relevant to the purported tests:
1.There is no prediction in my analysis to the effect that persons who invest
more in their early work experience will later earn more than persons who
invest less. This would be true only when the postschool earnings
capacity Y7 is the same for each individual i. Holding years of schooling
Lifetime Distribution of Earnings 509fixed is not sufficient, In my work I found that 40 percent of the variance is
due to variation in among men with the same schooling who,
moreover, worked the same number of weeks per year.
2.The coefficient p in Taubman's expression (4) refers to the correlation
between dollar investments and dollar earning capacity Y*. This should be
positive, and the implications for dollar growth and for growth of dollar
variances are consistent with the findings. However, in the analysis of
relative (percent) growth of earnings and of variances of logarithms of
earnings, p is a correlation between time-equivalents of investment with
levels of earning capacity (In y*), The latter p can be zero or negative,
when the former is positive.
3.The fact that a near-zero value of p can give rise to a structure which is in
part similar to the predictions of stochastic theories does not warrant a
rejection of the investment(job-training) theory. Indeed, other parts of the
structure are shown to be inconsistent with "random shock" theories in
my monograph (Chapter 7), and the stochastic theory rejected in favor of
the investment theory which is consistent with the observed structure.
4.Some approximations are better than others, but itis particularly far-
fetched in the Thorndike sample to assume that persons in it had the
same number of years of work experience in a given calendar year (1955),
even if the persons had the same education. In this sample, there is a
large variation among individuals in the chronology of their schooling,
military service, and job experience. Taubman's tests are of doubtful
value in view of this variation.
5.Taubman's brief sketch of human capital analysis suggests a flavor of
monomania to it. This is a misunderstanding of the concept of human
capital and of the function of parsimonious models. Apart from this
objection Ido accept the proposition that labor markets function well
enough for the purposes of my analysis, as the predicted tendencies in
the wage structure do appear in the observations. I am not aware of a
better definition of "functioning well."
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